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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIEUl (D., ~10NTANA)

THOUGHTS ON THE PRESIDENT I S IMPENDING VoYAGE TO
LATIN AMERICA

Mr. President:

Within a few days, the President will be leaving on a tour
of Latin America.

I know that other Members of the Senate join with

me in wishing him a most pleasant journey.
There is every reason to believe that we shall not witness,

in connection with the President's impending trip, a repetition of
the reprehensible vilification that marked an earlier goodwill tour
of the distinguished Vice President of the United States

(Mr.

Nixon).

On the contrary, tbere is every reason to believe that the President
will be welcomed with enthusiasm wherever be goes.

The President 1s a

~

man and be evokes a warm response.

I hppe that after he leaves the Presidency, be will continue--as a
private citizenuto make .lourneys such as be 1s now making, to various

parts of the world.

I hope that the next President will prevaU upon

Mr. Eisenhower to do 50 in the interests of the nation.

Journeys by

persons of such obvious goodwill as Mr. Eisenhower can only be welcomed
in a world 50 replete with ill-will as the one in which we live.
But, Mr. President, I am bol.d enough to suggest that, at
this moment in time} something more than a journey is needed in our
relations with the nations of Latin America.
relations 1s far from good.

The state of those

Nor are these relations likely to be

improved merely by the ritual of goodwill tours endlessly repeated.
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Travel by the President to other nations is not an end in
itself.

The President abroad is not just a tourist, be 1s the personi-

fication of the nation.

Hia appearances on foreign soil can never be

casual; nor can they be mere gestures of goodwill.

The President is the

fountain-head of action in this nation in matters of foreign policy.

I

would hope that his appearance in Latin America, particularly at this
time, signifies action as regards inter-American policies.

Let us face it:

The relations between this nation and Latin

America are plagued with problems and irritants .

Unless thi s impending

voyage is a prelude to coming to grips with these problems and irritants
it would be better if it were not made at all.

Unless it signifies

action, the good\ll11 effects vill soon wear off and the after-taste will

be doubly bitter.

The pleasant climate which the visit will quickly en-

gender will chill just as quickly.
I emphas ize, Mr. President, it is the follow-through--what
comes after--not the goodwill t our itself which will affect the deeper
fortunes of this nation in its relations with the other Latin American
republics.
doors.

In short, the PreSident, in his person alone, can open

But if they are to remain open it must be clear why they were

opened in the first place ; and, in subsequent action, the administrative
bureaucracy of this nation must be led firmly by the President to keep
them open.
For that reason 1 I commend once again to the SeD8. te and to
the President and his Administration, a recent report of the Senator
from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) on a trip which he made to Latin America a
few OlOnths ago.

In his report, "Mr. Hemisphere, I1--for that is a

sobrequet whicb be most Justly deserves--in his report, the distinguished
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Sena~r

outlines e. program of far - reaching constructive action with

respect to Latin America.

In his report, the able Senator points the

way to coming to grips with the problems and lrr! tants which bave ac-

cumulated in inter-American relations.

I suggest that if the President

wishes to give to this impending goodwill tour a fruitful. and lasting

value to the nation that be direct his attention to that report and

consider its implications in conjunction with the heads of states with
whom he will meet and, subsequently, that he lead the administrative
bureaucracy in line with the implications.
I would add only two other thoughts at this moment to what
1s contained in the report of th.e Senator from Vermont.

I believe

that it 1s time to recogo1ze--in Inter-American policy--the growing

trend in the world toward regional groupings, towards common markets.
This trend is already well advanced in Europe.
made its formal appearauce in the Western

Indeed, last year ] it

Hemiephere·~in

an agreement

among 5 Central American Republics which haa since run into certain
difficulties.

This week seven additional Latin American nations have

signed an agreement opening the way to a common market as among
selves.

In short, there i3 a

n~w

them~

force operating in the realm of

inter~

national economics and trade and we will ignore its meaning to us and
to the rest of the Americas only to our detriment.

The implications

of this new force of regionalism warrant full and joint exploration by
all the American Republics.

Its potential as a tool for dealing with

some of the most unyielding economic problems of
tions should be fully evaluated.
fresh inspiration.

inter~American rela~

We need to think: boldly and with

tole need to consider whether a common market for

- 4all the Americas, including Canada it it so desires, can serve the interests of the nations of this hemisphere.

I can conceive of no better

time and place for giving to this exploration a firm political tsPetus
than the occasion of the President's coming goodwill tour to Latin
America.

In this connection, I am deligpted that the President is going
to stop in Puerto Rico.

The relations between the Puerto Rican Common-

wealth and the United States are, 1n major part, built upon the successful operation of what is, in effect, a common market .

This operation

has redounded to the immense and pyramiding economic advantage of both

the United States and the Commonwealth.
I can think of no man who is better equipped to counsel with

the President in t his matter as well ae in other aSpects of 1nterAmerican relations than the brilliant and distinguished governor of
Puerto Rico (Mr. Munoz -Marin) and, indeed, I regret that he is not
accompanying the President on this SOodwill tour.

During his entire

life, Mr. Munoz-Marin has l i ved and breathed and pondered the basic
problems of Puerto Rico in its rel ationship with the United States.
He has led in the successful search for the solutions to many of these
problems .

His wealth of experience can provide new 1nsi&J,ts into almost

every facet of inter-American relations on the larger scale of Hemispheric
relations.
If I may summarize, Mr. President, may I say again that I wish
the President a most pleasant journey to Latin America.

And to make it

most useful, I respectfully direct his attention to the recent report of
the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken), to the concept of a
common market for the Americas, and to the wise counsel which he can
obtain from the outstanding governor of Puerto Rico (Mr. Munoz-Marin).

fO R RELf: .\SE
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STATEMENT OF SEIIATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MOIlTAllA)

THE 2ND GERMAII CRISIS
Mr. President:

In recent weeks, two serious incidents have taken place in connection
with Berlin.

They reveal once again, with stark clarity, the potentiality of

conflict which is iOherent in that situation.

The first incident was that of

the Allied military plan to fly planes above the 10,000 foot level on the airlanes to Berlin.

The second involved an attempt of corrmur..ist border guards to

switch the passes of allied personnel traveling the land routes to Berlin.

Had

the switch worked, allied personnel would have been compelled to acknowledge

the authority of the East German regime 1n place of the Soviet Union over the
approaches from the West.

Hence, the Russians would have been in a position

to absolve themselves £l'om responsibility for subsequent interference with
allied passage to Berlin.

T~is

second incident led to a prompt reprisal against

the movement of Soviet personnel in Uestern Germany.
These inCidents, each in its own way, represented the placing of the
chip on the shoulder.

They were the dares of children carried over into the

deadly game of devastating military confrontation.
Fortunately, the interaction of reprisal--counter-repriaal- -came to
a halt before it had. gone very far.

Fortunately, the chips were removed from

the shoulders by those who had placed them there instead of being sent flying
at some point by one side or the other .

That these incidents did not lead to

serious consequences may well have been due solely to the intervention of the
highest political authorities, President Eisenhower in one instance and Mr.
Khrushchev in the other.
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In this fashion is the way to the summit kept open, but--let us not
delude ourselves--tbe way of almost haphazard descent into disaster is not
closed.
closed

It 1s avoided for the moment but it is not closed.
60

Nor will it be

long a6 the problems of a divided Berlin, encased as they are in

the problems of a divided Germany and the still larger problems of a divided

Europe are not faced, so long as they are not faced with policies which fit
today's realities rather than with yesterday's generalities.
What are these antiquated generalities on Gel'Qao:r, f.1r. PreSident,
to which all involved appear still to

eralities are these:

cll~

On the

Sovle~

siee, the gen-

In some fashloD, at some time, all of Germany will become

a communist state if only the Western presence can be r emoved from Berlin aDd
the two parts of Germany kept sharply separated for the indefinite future.
And the generalities on the part of the Western allies?

Our poli-

cies hold. that at some time, in some fashion, all of Germany will be drawn
into the Western camp if on!y the allied

pres~nce

remains in Berlin and if

we can will out of existence that half of Germany which is held by the communists until such time as it can become a part of and subject to the political
control of a united Germany.
There are certain similarities, Mr. PreSident, in the two positions.
In communist poliCies, no less than in those of the Western allies, great
significance i s attached to control of Berlin.

Further, both positions taCitly

regard the present division of Germany as preferable to the alternatives to
unity which have so far been proffered.

And, apparently, at least the highest

political leadership on each side is fully cognizant of the catastrophiC consequences of total military conflict in present circumstances and seeks, there-

l

fore, to avoid its use in the pursuit of political objectives in Germany.
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If these are the

generalitle~vhat

riding reality 1s that there are two

Gel~n

are the re&lttles?

The over·

authorities in one Germany and

there 1s no indication whatsoever that either is going to go away in peace.
The present division is maintained 1 on one side, by a German authority with
a high degree of public support and popular participation, by the presecce
of allied forces in Berlin, by the symbol of I-lATals protection.

It is main·

tained, on the other Side, by a very low degree of public support propped up
with totalitarian controls, backed. by Soviet armed forces and such guarantees
as are contained in the Communist Warsaw pact.
Germany into

t~·o

In shOl't, the division of

politlce,l entities exists wbether it 1s recognized or not.

In these Circumstances, I see no likelihood that the generalities
of Soviet policy on Germany lead anywhere but in circles endlessly travelled.
Nor do I see-win present circumstances--that Western generalities lead anywhere but in circles endlessly travelled.

That has certainly been the ex-

perience of the past decade and a half.
In short, Hr. President, as between the Hestern allies and the
Soviet bloc there is stalemate in Germany.
in peace.

There will be no Hestern retreat

Nor do I see the probablli ty of a Soviet withdrawal in peace .

He

may be able to maintain the situation without total war --at Berlin no less
than in Germany as a whale- -if we are prepared to pay the price.

The Com-

munists can maintain it, too, and even challenge it at Berlin if they are
prepared to pay the price.
The question for us, no less than for them, is not:
situation be maintained1

Rather, it is;

Can the present

Do we want to maintain it1

situation in the highest interests of the Western nations1
truth, in the highest interests of the Soviet people?

Is this

Is it, in all

Is there an alternative

which better SErves these highest interests on both sides?
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The need for an alternative is indicat ed, I believe, by historic
German unification will not wait fo.!:'ever.

experience.

At some point the

Germans themselves 'Will tire of the present disunity l'T hich is imposed upon

them largely by the ideological differences of the Western nations and the
Soviet Union.

If the mood of a plague on both your houses sweeps through

that country it may well upset the delicate balance upon which the peace of

Europe and the world is now hinged .

For that reason, alone, Mr. President ,

we must seek, even as the Russians must seek, in a mut ual interest in the
survival of a recognizable civilization, we must seek a Hay to end the present
stalemate.

It is too great a risk for mankind--for the Russians no less than

the Western nations--to assume an indefini te German acquiescence in the present
division.
We need, further, Mr. President, to devise a new situation at Berlin,
not for West Berlin alone, as the Russians would have it, but for all Berlin.
For, it is at that point that the intimate juxtaposition of opposing military
forces creates the gravest danger of careless or accidental sparks which may
go beyond the control of those who play with the fire.

This point is under-

scored by the incidents to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks
and by others of a similar nature going back to the time of the Berlin Blockade.

The point of no return has not yet been transgressed in these incidents

but let no one assume that, with the hair-triggering of modern military
establishments, that point will continue indefinitely to be avoided.
Finally, Mr. President, some way other than stalemate in Germany
1s essential, if the huge burden of armaments is not to grow beyond the
oapacities of all peoples to bear.

Certainly it is essential if we no less

than the Russians mean seriously to lighten this burden.

\.J'e may well ask
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ourselves:

How much of our annusl military budget of $40 or more billions 1s

occasioned by this stalemate1

Row much of the budgets of the Russians, the

British, the French, indeed, the budgets of just about every nation in Europe?
We are correct when we stand firm in the face of a Soviet provoca-

tion at Berlin . But standing firm, alone, meets only the immediate provocation.
It does not face these other factors in the German Situation, the factors which
strongly indicate that the present stalemate 1s not adequate.

Standing firm,

alone, does not meet the question of the essential need for peaceful progress
on German unification.

Standing firm, alone, does not meet the question of

the daneer of accidental war or war by child-like provocation at Berlin.

Stand-

ing firm, alone, does not meet the question of the inter-relationship between
a dangerously divided Germany and a danserously divided Europe--the delicate
balance between peace and war.

Hence, it does not meet the question--let

alone of disarmament--but even of the capacity of the nations involved to bear
the burden of armaments, along vith all the other burdens of an increasingly
complex civilization.
We may believe that we are countering the immediate provocation,
but we do not face these essential questions by proposing to hold plebiscites
in Western Berlin on the eve of a summit conference, especially plebiscites
whose results are a foregone conclusion.

In election after election--the

most recent in December 1959--the people of Berlin have made clear beyond any
doubt that when faced with a choice between freedom and cOtllDlUllist absorption,
they will choose overwhelmingly, for freedom, even freedom on the razor's
edge.

I can see no virtue in a parade of West Berliners to the polls once

again to prove what bas been provenli over and over again, even to the point
of Soviet acknowledgment.

I can see harm in it, particularly in a world

- 6 that has had a surfeit of propaganda in recent years.

may hammer home more firmly the existing stalemat e.

A gesture of that kind

It does not face the

questions which suggest that it 1s time to end the stalemate .
Nor are these questions faced by Mr. Khrushchev when be se'ek.a to

alter the status of West Berlin alone.

To be sure the situation in \lest

Berlin may be trabnormal" as the President and Mr. Khrushchev apparently have
agreed.

But one does oot achieve normalcy by compounding the abnormality.

If the situation in West Berlin 1s abnormal now, it would be even more abnormal
to substitute for it the situation which Mr. Khrushchev

~s

proposed.

For, he

would leave as the sole Gertll90U authority in what will one day be again the
capital. of all Germany, a militant minority, the German communist reg:tme of

east Germany.

He would leave, in this fashion, the symbolic citadel of German

unification in the hands of those with the least claim to it.

As for the

international enclave of freedom, which would remain in West Berlin, it would
matter little whether its safety were guaranteed or not.
German authority in Berlin, their

capita~

It would be to the

not to a sleepy international enclave,

to which more and more Germans would look for leadership and inspiration.
Nor are the questions faced on our part by a continued advocacy
of free all German elections.

Communism will not write its death warrant

in East Germany in this fashion, not when it is holding the gun.

We may call

for free elections and, indeed, we should; but let us not delude ourselves
into believing that this will bring about unification or in any way act to
end the present stalemate.

We have called ourselves hoarse on this point

for a decade and a half and 60 far as anyone can see, the German totalitarian
regime in the East bas used this time to drive the stakes of possession more
firmlo' into the ground.

l

- 7 Nor are the questions of the stalemate faced by the Russians, Mr.
President, when they call for formal recognition of t he division of Germany
and certification of the division in peace treaties wi th two Gercanies.

How

many wars need to be fought before it 1s perceived, at last, ttat a numerous

and determined people once seized with the sense of national unity are not
likely to be kept forever apart in peace?

Countless forgotten agreements

which have presumed to make permanent by paper such cleavages gather dust in
the archives of history.

What I am suggesting,

v~.

President, is that i f there is to be

reasonable hope for peace, there must be reasonable hope soon for the reunification of Germany.

The absence of such hope may very well convert the

rational urge to national unity into the irrational urge

fo~ co~quest

and,

in this connection, it is significant to note that a substantial body of
Germans already identify East Germany as Middle Germany and look to the lands
beyond the

O~er~Neisse

as the true East.

It is not fBrwfetched to assume that

the patterns of the past may repeat themselves, in modern garb, in circumstances provided by the continued German cleavage, by the deep divisions in
Europe, by a world which hangs continually by fingertips from the sill of
incipient disaster.
The pressures of the German situation are little different, today,
from what they were, when a year asp, their prolonged neglect, led to the
first German crisis.

That they did not erupt, then , was due to the round of

goodwill tours, the visiting back and forth and hitter and yon.

How much

longer these safety valves will operate , it is difficult to say . Uhat can
be said with certainty is that it is unsafe to rely indefinitely on safety
valves.

- 8 Sooner or later the nations involved must come to grips with the
realities of the German situation as it is today.

It 1s probable that the

longer the 'lllOment of reckoning 1s put off, the sm.a.llcr will be the margin

for peace, a durable peace.

If the pressures in the German situation are the same as they were
a year ago, it seems to me that the means with which

~hey

peace are also similar to those which were indicated then.

might be dealt in

At that time , the

Senate will recall that I advanced for discussion 9 essentials upon which a
firm western policy for peace might conceivably be built .

It is among these

pOints, I believe, in which we may still find the way to solution.

As then, so nov, the focal point of potential conflict 1s Berlin,
where the military confrontation 1s most intimate and

uneta~

e.

As then ,

ao now, the answer to this problem does not lie in propaganda stances or
gestures; nor does it lie in the incantation of the worda of firmness while
the first of the deferred payments of appeasing concession 1s made for the
dubious privilege of maintaining the existing stalemate.

Nor does it lie

in the astute proposal of Mr. Khrushchev to alter the status of llest Berlin
alone, even if the guarnntees which he proffers for that altered status were
absolute.
The answer, the answer for peace, it seems to me, lies in a change
of status for al.l Berlin, for East Berlin no less than \.[est Berlin.

The

answer, it seems to me, lies in agreement which permits this city--this entire city--and its routes of access to be held in trust by the United Nations
or some other international body, with neutral forces respons:!ble to its
authority, until such time as it is once again the capital of all Germany.

Le, this new interim status for

the entire city be guaranteed by the Allied

·9·
nations . by the cotmnUo1at nations, by the United nations.
1~

maintaining the city

Let the cost of

trust be borne by the two principle German political

authorities which have the greatest steke in

1t~-by

portions equal to the authority which they claim.

Bonn and

Panko~--in

pro-

Beneath an international

authority, let the two German authorities begin the long and difficult task

of merging the two parts of what 1s one city .
In a setting of that kind, Mr. President, we might contemplate -the beginning

of the end of the present dangerous juxtaposition of Soviet and Allied forces.
vIe might find as valid the withdrawal of both Soviet and Allied forces from

Berlin.
In the microcosm of Berlin, moreover, could be cast the molds of reunification
for all of Germany.

I think it 1s clear that that reunification is not going

to begin on the basis of free all-German e1ections in the foreseeable future.
Nor does the formula offered by the Russians offer any greater hope, for they
vould formalize the division of Germany into two German nations, Yith a vague
provision for future negotiations between these tvo nations on the question
of unification .
If there is to be a well-founded hope for German reunification in peace, it
must be recognized by all that ve are dealing vi th one German nation in which

there are two German political entities.
play with

~rds

I say that, Mr. President, not to

but in an effort to define more precisely the reality which

confronts us, for it is only in terms of that reality that we can hope to act
for peace 1n Germany.
To divide Germany into two nations, as the Russians suggest, will not change
the fact that there is one Germany.

It may postpone the day when that unity

will reassert itself but it will also increase the violence of the pressure
for unification and
channels.

~

well thrust that pressure from rational into irrational
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Similarly to insist upon free all-German elections at this time , as the route
to unification, is also to postpone the day of unification, 1n all probability,
with the same consequences.

This route, unfortunately, is closed by the 10e6-

capable fact that there are two political entities in the one Germany.

While

one entity might achieve supremacy by this route, the other 1s not likely to
conduct its own burial 1n peace by this route.

If these are the facts, as I believe them to be, and if it 1s desirable to
break the stalemate nov in Germany, 8S I believe it to be, then it follows
that there should be one peace treaty

w~th

entities sharing responsibility for it.
ance and persuasion as can be

provid~d

Germany, with both German political

It follows that both, with such assistfrom without, must assume deep responsi-

bilities in the task of unification because that task will be most difficult ,;,
in the lapse of 15 years, institutions have grown up in the two parts of Germany which will not readily be reconciled, one with the other.

It follows , too,

that if there cannot be free all-German elections at this time > there must be
at least a guaranteed measure of equal political freedom and of equal political
participation for all Germans, living in each of the two political entities
at this time.
Finally, to act for peace, not only 1n Germany but in all Europe and to give
substance to the professed universal deeire for a lightening of the burden of
armaments> there must be recognition on all sides that present military arrangements in Germany and, in deed> in all Europe are not sacrosanct.

If there is

an end to the military confrontation at Berlin, if there is visible progress
in peace towarde German unification> then there can be, there ought to be> a
general easement of the entire European military confrontation and the development of all -European agreements for safeguarding the peace.

The Eden, the

Rapacki and similar proposals of the past warrant the most careful consideration
in this connection.
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Mr. President, what I suggested in February, 1959, and what I say today, seems
to me to encompass the essential elements of a new Weatern approach to the problems of Germany and Europe.

If one holds that the present stalemate is greatly

in our interest then I suppose there 1s little point in considering these elements.

If one holds, as I hold, that the present stalemate 1s not in our highest

interest and if we are to have a chance to avoid both the pitfalls of appeasement and conflict in the days, mouths and years ahead, then these elements of
a new policy, I believe, are worthy of the most careful and

cont1nuO~5

consid-

eration.
During the past year, I believe they have received such consideration in this
country and elsewhere.

It seems to me that Western policy, particularly as

manifested at the Geneva Conference ot :fure:ign t-1inisters last spring, reflects
a movement
today.

a~ay

from the generalities of yesterday towards the realities of

I hope that Hestern policy in the period ahead will reflect the views

of all the Allied nations, but the domination of no single nation and, in so
doing, will continue the process of transition to new tenets.
There is no assurance that this tranSition will bring about the settlement
which Europe and the world needs .

There is no assurance that a similar and

essential transition will take place in Soviet policies and without it, there
will be no agreement.

But whatever the Soviet reaction, this transition in our

own policies needs to continue in the highest Western interests and in the interests of mankind.
He cannot ignore our own responsibilities on the assumption that others will
ignore theirs.
neglect.

'·le cannot, for we shall suffer along with others, for our own.

There 1s no escape.

There is no retreat.

hope that others will do the same.

But

\Ie

~le

must seek a change and

must not avoid a change if it is in

our interests, regardless of vhat others may do or not do.

We must seek, in new

r

•
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policies, an agreement which eases rather than
which paves a practical way to the peaceful

appea ~~~

un1f1~ati ~ n

at Berlin, an agreement
of Germany, an agreement

which begins to stitch the cleavage between Europe- -East and West .

Let others

obstruct such en agreement if they will but let us not ignore these needs 1n our
policies, these needs which are the most
the Hestern
of

~lestern

~·lorld.-

compelli~g

that confront the people of

-the people of Russia and Eastern Europe no less than those

Europe and the United States.
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Address of Senator Mike Mansfield (D. > Montana)

58th Annual Seasion of the
Inland Empire EducatiouAssociation
Spokane, Washington
April 8, 1960

An invitation such as you extended to me 1s an invitation to
come home.

It 1s an invitation to thlok through old questions in the

fresh but familiar perspective of this wonderful part of the nation.

Of these questions, that of foreign relations 1s most compelling.

As Americans, we need 'to understand the problems of foreign

relations because none of us escapes their consequences.

As teachers--

I am still one of you a.lthough my membership in the club has temporarily
lapsed--a8 teachers, we need not only to understand these problems but

also to stimulate the capac i ty ot others to understand them.

We need

especially to convey something of their meaning to the young people
who must live in the world which our :forelgc policies now are doing much

to shape.
Let me say, at the outset, that foreign relations are not the
products of

e.lch~.

They are the consequeo.ces of human acts.

they ere not beyond normal human comprehension.

As such

To be sure, the conduct

of foreign relations is largely in the hands of specialists and that is

as it should be.

But in a nation such as ours, the work of these

specialists needs the understanding and broad guidance of our people if'

it is to be done moat effectively .
Foreign relations arise because each nation 1n the world, ae
it comes into contact with others, bas its hopes, its interests, its
fears.

Each expresses these national drives in its foreign policy .

If

the policy is effective, it advances the hopes and interests of a nation,
not at the expense of others, but by the process of reconciliation and
accommodation .
BO

In so doing, it mitigates the fears on all sides.

In

doing, it acts for peace.
To put it briefly, an effective foreign policy is one which

serves national needs in a complex world, a worJ.d of many nations and
many needs, by methods other than those of the jungle.
How do we grasp the

essence of these mattere'l

vey an understanding of them. to others'?

How do we coo-

'.rhese are questions which have

preoccupied me for some time, particularly 1n anticipation of this meeting with you who are specialists in the process of understanding the
complex and helping others to learn to understand it.
It seems to me that we do not begin to appreCiate the dimensions
of the problems of foreign relations, if we employ as yardsticks such
:f'am1liar teI'll1S as isolationism. or internationalism..

These are ambiguities

of the past and they do not help us in the present.

As far as isolation-

ism. 1s concerned, I think

that, ss a nation, we have long since recognizee.

the impracticability of a policy designed to insulate ourselvea or even

the Western Hemisphere from. the Olassive currents which floil through the
'Wor~d

and the stOrtllS 'Which beset it .

The military conflicts, three in

the lifetime of some of us, have dispelled the illusion of isolation.

As a more recent reminder, if' any is needed, I call to your attention
the Soviet test rocket which dropped into the Pacific some weeks ago .

It landed about an hour after it had left a launching pad almost 8,000
miles away.
I do not think it 1s necessary to labor the point.

It is

clear that, for better or for worse, we are in and of this world or,
in these days of space exploration, perhaps I should say in and of this
universe.
if'

It is obvious that it will be for worse rather than better

we cJ.ose our eyes

to that

fact or

try

10

pull the cover over our

heads to shut out that f'act.
I do not say that the urge to 1solation16ill, this urge to escape
from reality is gone entirely from the nation .

It is there to some de-

gree but it is no J.onger the principal source of our difficulties in
foreign relations.

The present problems come more, I believe, from a

rather widespread belief that all which is class1f'iable as internationalism
has, per se, a special claim. to virtue.

The fact 1s there nre no panaceas in an 1o.d1scr1minate embrace
of internationalism

~re

than there is escape in isolationism.

13 the point I wish to stress lOOst stroo.gly.

That

Let me illustrate it by a
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story which, since you are teachers, may shock you b'J.t a story whose
meaning will rot be l.o'3t on you.

As teachers we know, I think, better

than most, of the inmense 'Talue to our relations with other nations, of

improving our abilities in foreign .lrulgua.ges.

In recent years, the

teaching prof'cssion has given great em;phaais to the study of languages

and the government has taken stepe to encourage it.
sirable development.

That is a tIIOst de-

What we may overlook in our present enthusiasm for

this great tool, hOtrever, is that it ia only a tool..
proof guar811tee of' effective foreign relations.

It is not a fool-

The story with which I

wish to illustrate the point 1s that of an Aoer1can diplomat in Latin
Amarica some years ago .

He cede public statom.ents 'Which did e great deal

of damage to our relations with that part of the wrld.

Yet he spoke

these statements in perfect Spanish of which he was e. t:laster.
Americans were astounded by his knowledge of Spanish.

The Latin

They were even

more astounded aDd, in addition, were infuriated by what be said in
Spanish .

Obviously, here 'Was a case where our relations might well have

profited from someone with rather les6 capability of communicating in

that language .
As it 1s with languages" so it io with policieo of internationalism in general.

It by no means follows that if tive American

military bases abroad are hel pful, ten will be doubly hel.pful .

It by

no means tallows that an aid-program 'Which costs $5 billion e. year will
be 5 times more useful than a program which costs $1 billion.

It by no
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means follows that

u~r~e~res~J[es

are doing an

ef~ect1ve

job in a country in AOie., 200 re!)resentatives vill increase the effectiveness by a factor of 10 .

It by no means follows that each additional

agency added to the United Nations system will increase the total con.tr ibut10n which that useful system makes to peace.

In short, 1n any category

of action, not excluding international. action, it i8 possible not

o~

to

go beyond the point of diminishing returns b . .lt even to the point of increasing loss.
What I

am. suggesting, then, is that we need to divest oursel.ves

of the notion that o.ll :poliCies, all acts 8utomatlco.liy are to be sanctioned if they are classifiable under the general heading of

ism.

inte~national-

There can be illusions no less misleading, no leas dangerous to the

hopes and interests of' the nation in this generalization than those which
appeared at an earlier time in the guise of isolationism. .

The basic problem of maintain1ng effective foreign relations
and of' buUd1ng peace, insofar as we can contribute to it, 11es not so
much in more policies or more machinery but in giving fresh direction to
existing policies and in refining the mach1neryby which these policie s
are now pursued .

If we would meet this problem we need, first, to see

the world as it is.

We need to see it a s it 1s now, before we can

reasonably hope to see it as we should. l.ike it to be .

We need to see

our present policies as they are, rather than as we imagine them. to be .
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no illuaion in our present understnodinu of the uorld is more
misleading than that .thich

(l,"SUl:'I.CS

truce was signed in Korea in 1953 .

that there has been peace since a

To equate the present situation in

that country or, lndeed in most parts of the world '<l1th peace, may well
be to equate it nth the period of 1940 iu L'urope, the period of the ~-

called "Phony 'War" just prior to the German drive into the Lowlands and

France or with the state of Japanese-American relations on the eve of
Pearl Harbor .

If it is enough to define peace as the

~ediate

absence or

gun-fire then I suppose the present world-situation, on the whole,
be 60 regarded .

But if peace means

~

to you what it means to me, a

reasonable assu.rance that the young people whose education 1s now io

your charge shall have an opportunity through that education to develop
their potentialities and to groW' into constructive maturity without the
ever-present prospect of sudd.en 8.IlC1. ilIl!lense devastation being visited

upon them, then the present 51 tuation cannot be defined as peace.
have a long way to go to peace.

To create the illU3ion that we have

already arrived at it ia to do a grave disservice to the nation .
may I se.y, is one

We

at the principal ci.s.n8ers of goodwill tours

That,

and. meetings

at the m..unm1t, whatever advantae;es they may offer .
We shall not achieve peace by studying the e.pplause meters or

the comparative Hooper ratings of Mr . Khrushchev and Mr . Eisenhower in
India or France or wher ever e1.se t.hey

~

visit .

The road to peace does

not lie in the winning of i nternational popularity oontests .

Rather , it
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lies

in areduction of ~e~i[ p:':1Loos

towards military clash.

and systems of nations

It lies in a frank recognition of conflicting

national interests and ideological hopes and, if they cannot be reconciled
at this time, in turning them away !'rom the channels which lead to the
nuclear destruction of a recognizable civilization in the world .
If we scan the principal regions of the world VEl shall be able
to discern quickly that t..ltere is no peace in this sense, but, instead, a

series of points of potential conf1ict.

In the Far East, these points are

to be found in Korea, in the Formosan Straits and 1n Indo-China.

of these areas, a truce written or unwritten prevails.

In each

The truce concea.1s

but it does not heal the ideological and political divisions vhicb plague

the Korean people, the Chinese people, and the people of Viet Ram and Laos.
In the case of Korea, the 38th parallel is still guarded 24 hours a day
botn sides.

00.

In the Formosan Straits, Chinese cOIlIllWlist guns fire from the

mainland at the outpost islands of the nationalists--at Quemoy and Matsu-every other day.

In lwio-China--1n Laos--there

'WaS

a narrow eacape from

a large-scale conflict just a few months ago and the situation remains un-

stable.

In Viet Ifarn a rigid division separates the communist north from.

the free south and shows no si811s of closing in peace.

In short, throughout the Far East, there exists, in excess, one
of the !!lOst conmoo. precip1tants of war·,-ullD4tural political divisions of
peoples who are in reality deeply united by culture, by geography and by

history .
divisions .

I shal.l. not review the circumstances which brought about the
All of them, to be GUre, are overl.aid with the ideological
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EiChism between communism and freedom.
own local. characteris·"ic.. .

It

But each division, too, has its

~~ .,~o t...'l.CSC

characteristics no les5 than

to the broader ideolo8iceJ. quest:Lon ..m.ich we must look i f there is ever
to be a full underotanding of tile sitaat:..ons aIld, h.::nce, a chance for
tll~m

to evo.lYe in the direction of a atable peace .

That refinenent of

the prob1.em in policy has yet to begin .
Until it bagin&, a basis does not exiGt upon wbtch to proceed
tovarO.o peace .

Any suggestion that our policies have actually Jilroduced

peace in these areas is gravely m.i.sleading .

It obscures the prablClns

which oooner or later, taay well engulf in c0n:flict not only thooe people 8
~ediatcly

involved but t.;.lC world and ournelves aEi a part of 1 t.

What our P0l1CiC6 have done 00 far in to buy tlmc in the Far
Bast.

Ole have spent billions through the deployment of our OYD. armed

forces in that region and through aid-programs to hold
a coumunist advance.

th~

line against

Thousauds of American and other lives were escri-

1'1ced to the same end in Korea .

But I repeat:

all we have done 00 far

is to buy time in the Fer East.
If' we look elsewhere in ASia, to China, we find still aoother
COUIOOU cause 01 conf'lict .

'We find 8 nation recently revived fran a long

slumber vhich had been induced by an inner decay and by outer pressures
upon it, now being revived under the rorccd draft of e militant totali-

tarian1sm .

This rcvi'led China tests its

ne".1/'

found. strength 1n an aggl'es-

eive and brutal probing into territories of its neighbors.

The Chine. of

today 1s a China which is vastly different--oo far as we can judge, for
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our information 1s all second.-hand--f'rOtl the China to W"h1ch
during World War

n.

It is

8.

\Ie

were allied

China. in uhich tC!lS of millious of young

people are coming of age witn no direct knovlcdge of Aoericans but 'With
an induced hatred of this country and its illst1tut1ons,.
Let no one 1.Ulderestimate the long-range effect of' these years

of animosity between ourselves and China.

It is, to

Gay

the least,

illusory to talk of peace while the animes! ty 1s present in virulent
form.

It is illusory to talk of peace vi th a China au the march, not

in the paths of progress by accoCltllOdat1on with other nations but iu the
ancient \lay of E:npire under a canopy of modern totalitarian trapj?ings.

I do not

~

that this development--this

emerge~ce

of a new and bristling

China- -in the heart of Asia mu.st lead 1nevitabl.y to war.

I do ss:y that

I see little in it or in our poliCies with respect to it which warrants

the assumption that ye are at pesce.
Moving westuard to the Middle Eaat, here, too, we find a situe.tion which by no stretch of the 1me.g1nation can be. identified as peace.
Rather, it is

0.

situation of suspended war.

On repeated occasions in

the past, the zuapension has all but ended in grave border cJ.ashes.

On

tHO occaSions, at the time of the Suez crisis and in connection with the
Lebanon crisis, the world dangled with one foot over the brink of' disaster.

Our po1itlcal intervention at the United Nations in connection with the
Suez crisis may have forestal.J.ed a total. collapse in the Middle East.

Our military intervention in Lebanon may have had the same effect.

But

communist penetration of that area--economic and pol1tical--has not been

curbed nor has a. basis for peace been established.

The Eisenhower doctrl
achiEr'/e both obJecthrc .

on the f1Ml.e East vas iatcuded to hel,p

too, ua

t2lc

C,lOl'IDOU

0UIIl8

ot public

which ha-/e ooe!l spetl on various k1nds of aid t.:) that area.
proved rooarkably 1

funds

Yet both have

i'f'ective.

It 18 conceivable that we r:JlJ3 have hel'ped to hout back thc ... lood-waters or conflict 1n taat r gion by our acts of' 1ntorventiCio and by our
aid" but va have dOne 11 tt1e it anyth ...ns to disperse or to rechann.cl t.'lU.!m.
constructively.

And. belli

the barriers 'Whlch our policies have tried to

build, the flood-vater3 arc accJ.1:$llating in a dangerous fashion.

outbreak in the Middle East a,ppear
In these circ.meta.aces it is

le~s

controllable than 1 ts

Each

~redoce8BOr .

to sa:r the least, ill:.l8Ory to talk or

peaCIl.

If' t..'lero 18 grave instability in the addle East, the 68lOO 10

true for Africa.

lev forces are at work in tm t continent which

'We

are

Just beginning to recogo.1ze 1n pollcy, let alone understand .
For decades Afr1ca "Jas pre:.?Qoderantly a region acted l.i.pon rather
than a region vh1 h acted in international relati-..>De.

Since the end

ot

World War II, however, 7 nC"1 nations have come into being in Mrica .
This yellt', an add1 tlonal. 5 are scheduled. to achieve IndcpeDdcmce and more
v1ll follow in due course.

Th1 s enorax)Us and r&;'lld pol! tical change

alone is sufficient to bring about massive lJrobl cma of readJuGtment .
1t is not only a political upheaval w.ich l"UI:1bles through that
tlnent.

gI'aa. t

But
con-

Other forces cotlElOn to all the underdeveloped nations, from

Eastern Asia to Latin America, are felt no less strt,ngly in Africa.

The

urge 1s there, tor human eQ.uality and for a cont1nuing md rapid !!IOdernlzatlon, With its promise of economic and social benef1t to al.l. peoples .

The urge 1s there, but the means to oatisfy it adequately in peace have

yet to be devised either by the Africa nation:; themselves or in coocert
with others.

Atyiin, Africa is in danger of being more acted UllOU rather

than acting itself in international. affaire a8 it finds itoeU' increasingly the focal paint of rival ideologies and systems.

This com;;>etitiotl

for African fa.vor may be flattering to the Africans for the moment but

1 t contains accwnulat1ng daneers to them and to peace .

The dangers w1l1

be curbed onl,y as Africa, increasingly, findn its ovm way in the world,
1arge~

by 1 ts

own genius and efforts.

I venture to

o~

that if the

continent is not sidetracked by the bl.andishments from. outside during
this transition, if' it does not become carelesG with the strong

new'

wine

of national. independence, it will in due course make an e!lOrtOOUs and
unique contribution to the progress of

I'!lftnk1 nd

and. to peace .

I should note in this connection that with the political transi-

tion in Afr1ca, the cQlllPosition of the United Nations General Assembly is
changing in a fashion uhich assures a decisive voice to the Afro-ASian
nations .

As you know, it 10 in the

given to world-vide aspirations .

Gener~

Assembly that expression iD

tie can hope that the Af'ro-Asian nations

and. this cation will mre and more see the problems of peace and. f:reedocl

in similar perspective and that their voice will be raised in hartoony
with our own .

That is, however, by DO meano a certainty .

If much de-

pends on the manner in wlllch the African nations develop end use their

newly achieved. fi"eedoin, !IlUCh also deperX1.s on the wisdom and the sensitivity

of' the policies of the older free nations towards the changes which are
taking place in the emergent African continent .

Much closer to home are the probJ.ema of peace in Le.tln America .

Ifotwithatanding the President I s recent goodwill tour we arc still faced

with the need for harmonization of Latin American interests with our owo .
Beneath the facade of Hemispheric unity there are deeg divisions and much
dissatisfaction

part1cul.er~

in economic matters.

Fortunatel¥, the

present &tate of our relations with Cuba is not typiceJ. of' our Latin
American relations.

But, then, neither was the very warm ve.lcome extended

to ]?reaident Eisenhouer in r;m;y wtIY typical.

As a

MOl'l

Eisenhmror invariably evokes a response of g>od.Will.

of goodwill, Mr .
A firm. basis for

sound relations, however, 1a not conjured up out of ceremonial journeyo
of less than two-weeks duration .

Such jou-""'tl.eYs may open doors but the

problem. 01' keeping them open 1s one of follow-through in po1icies.
It seems to me that the need now in intcz'-American relationn is
a broad lOOvement forward to
standing and cooperation .

'DIN

and higher grounds of hemispheric under-

We need this development in inter-American

education and cultural exchange DO less than 10. defense .
economic tlB.tters no less than in political. questions .

We need. it in

And if' our great

neighbor to the Worth, Canada, is 60 inclined, we should welcome its
participat10n in 8.l'iY and all matterl3 01' Hemispheric 1.ntexest.

this

t:XlI

Unless

ement forward begins soon 8Dd in earnest J I am afraid we fIJ8Y

anticipate in this hemisphere whose solidarity is an essential of peace,

at worst, more sharp clashes in the present Cuban pattern. and at best,
a steady erosion of hemispheric intimacy which Will increasingly drain
inter-American 1deals of their substance .

\

Turning next to EUJ."Ope,
peace "tlbich rausks

dcc~

lTe

f"ind there, too, an illusion of

and dru.lGcroua divisions.

That is perticul.orly

the cese in GertlEu:Jy but it io. also true of' the entire continent Hhich
is split eGsu.oder by the ideological cleavage.

Across the chasm. only

rickety bridc."'CG of' contc.ct ere maintained.
Ii' there 1:3 a need for progress t01:aro.C unity in the divided

counb'ica of AIJia, there is a compelling need for progr-css tOl1ards

uni~

f'ication in Germany and for a gro"l1ng rcconcil.ia.tion betITcen Eastern and
Western

~opc.

Until.

l~eccn~-,

at J.eaat, our policieo on Europe had remained.

unchanged in eZGcntinls for a decade .

~le

hll're been

c~

in a vast

hol.ding action in the fear t..'\ta.t the Russians mif1lt attack vlestern Europe,
a fear w1ch wo.s inter-mingled ,,11th the hor>e that sooner or later the
TIussians

,~uld

withdraW' from Eastern Gezme.ny end Eastern Europe .

end, we spent billiom to
in that region.

rc~

To that

Wcstern Europe and to maintain our forces

The RuSSians, sim.1larl¥, have engaged in

Do

'V"ast holitlng

action--an action in thc expectation that Uestern Euxopeon freodom

~ro'<l.ld

f'e..ll :prey to conttn.tniso and. an act:1on to hold on to 8 dominance in Eastern

Europe vh1ch they hod obtained :tn conzequcncc of Uorld t-lar II .

To that

end they have ko,llt milltary forceD in the Eastern Etu-opean nations and
rearmed thoce nation:J and, until the advent of' Hr . Khrushchev, tninil:Jl:.zod
conta.ctEL oo-m.rooll East and Hest .

It is increasingly clear that theze policies Mile not. led to

the achievement of
grIp

sho~"s

t~c

uimG of tile

on~ sid~

or the other,

The

commun~st

no aigna of 'Heilkeniug in Eastern Europe and freedom. has come

back with gr-eat vitality in ne::>tern EU.l'oJ,)e.
Cortainly, the DOlicico

UO">i

pursued have not led to peace .

They have been) on both side::» holding actions which have produced, at
best, an unstable truce based upon a Germany split inside the larger
c:?lit of Europe.

That the truce i.s h1gbJ.y unstable 'Was indicated by the

first Ge.rcan crisis last year .

This crisis arose u<,t of the !:.Icre announce-

ment that the Ru::mianc intended to cha.rlge one factor in the situation, that
is, to withdraw fran Berlin and the l'outes 0: access to the city in favor
of the East Gcrr.w.o. coomunists.

It ie ironic that a Russian announcement

of a withdrawal, of all things, should produce a crisis
~or

yet it did so,

the move threatened to upset the prezent delicate balance which depends,

with equal irony, on the continued Russian presence in Eastern Geroany.
In the round of' good"r111 tours and conferences, the Russians were
persuaded to remain 8 while longer in Berlin and Gercany and the crisis
eased .

The source of' crisis, however, remains in the outdated policies

of both sides in Europe.

In short" the tours and conferences have se:r.red

as saf'ety valves but I need hardly emphasize the danger of relying indefinitely on safety valves .

";ooner or later, it will be necessary to

come to grips in a practica1fashion with the probl.ems of a. divided. Gernany
and a divided Europe .

The visiting back and forth, notw1thstandingj the

promise of peace Will be illusory until the divisions in Germany and Europe
begin to clore 1n ,l,Icace on the basis of policies a.ttuned to today ' s reali-

ties r a ther than yesterday1s eJq)ectat:1ons .
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In the

armaments--

armaments of' massive destruction in particular--must begin to yield to
tangible solution before we can talk of peace in eny !Ile&ningf'ul. fashion.

We have watched the mathematicaJ. progression in the development of the
megatoo-power of these weapons since the end of Uorld War II.

The Russians,

the British, no less than ourselves, have advanced from a capability of destroying cities to a cE\Pe.bility of destroying nations, to
destroying civilization.

8.

capability of

The number of nations able to produce such weapons

has increased from 1 in 1945 to 4 'in 1960 and 1s subject to :further increase
if other countries who have the ca:pacity decide eo to deploy their science,

technology and energy.

The missiles of delivery have improved, f'rom the

crude but destructive V-Bombs which carr:ied devastation to London in the
closing days of World. War II to those which encircle the moon and the
sun in

1960.
All the while the wisest humans among us, the most compaSSionate

humans among us have warned the world of

~t

it 1s about in this

race for (p:'eater and more certain mesns of human annihilation.

d~

All the

while, there have been disarmanent conferences in uhich these verda of the
wise have been echoed with a remarkable unanimity by all nat10ne.

Yet a

decade and a half has po.3Sed and we have yet to achieve a single agreement,
:;igned and sealed, for the control. of armaments.

the diITicu1.ties invol.ved in this process but

I do not Wish to minimize

sure~

there is oom.cthing

amiss, something illu60ry when &11 endorse the warnings of wlsdom, 'When
all agree on the extent of the danger to aJ.l and yet agreement is not
achieved which makes possible even the beginnings of' a beginning of sub-

otsnce on this critical problem..
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In lY55, ! suegested that a SUBl1+ conterenc:e be held on '"..he
one qu_st1cn "1 end.1m; the teat_De

.e

ca~

be on the vergp of

£:lCh

a con.!ere "e.

It it can.

produce this

DOW

ono aehievoceo.t it n l l mark a mjor, it lor1£-dc1e.yed, :step forward .
po:"tant ae i t :o'J.ld b .... .1

or a lone road.

'ln~il

O'\-ever

I:n.-

this ach1clf'E!ment Will be but the start

t.'1crc ::x!sts a t1-"'1D. pattern. ror the progressive

c.:xtension ot 1ntcl'r.ationaJ:.

c()n~rol.

over I'J.I"'"lO:lents we will do ",-ell n0t to

likc:i.y' W be (:3tablishcd untll the pol1t1c.nl difference:3 and divisions

vt.:lch I bavc bee:).

s1ve 601ut"'.on.
but I

diSCa3~i!'lS

bc{;.ln e.J.:;o i;O yield

to

~tlca1

and progres-

In ta.:.s connectiOn, ! ac;y be wrong and I hope I

\,; little 11l.c... llir-"Jd t:::.at the cur:-en;

8C:BG1(J1l

ot th.e

fC

vrong

d1G8IUU1cnt

eccssor8~

vill 1.ead

to Il1rJ ouceaent of sub,tancc .

~..as

made, in the ,J)8st decade, a vast lntarn.st1onnl effort .

'!'hat effort

baB hel:pcd. to keep open the ProSIloot for peac_ but it haG not yet bezun
t.) produce conditione of

./?C8CO

in aoy o1gnlf'1c8nt dcc;rco .

instance 10 this 'lS)re evident than 1n forc1e;n aid .

In tn single

We have 1I8de ,,"allable

tor such purposes, f'".mds crpprcacillng 100 bIllion since th(,) e':ld of World
War

n.

'rho great blllk IJt t:lis aid haa gc:le to restore tho

va.r or to hold by ::lflitary

1DCa:lS

~,:;;

of

crlBt1.ng Bituat!cn!J aea1nst deterioration.

The podtive aspect ot aid as it 1s currently ex;-,rcssod 1n the Po1nt Four
Program. of technical coope:ratlon and in lcans for mod.ern developacnt has

a relatively small i/art of the toto.l
Plan cwae to e. eucccl.:>Gft:.l
1.1.e

?rc;~;..dent

h0·.teVCr~

tG,j:~uo.tion.

has :i.'el,l.uested

)~ . l

In the

ever since the Marshall

c~~ent

year, for exaillple,
01' this total,

"oi.lli()ll i'or foreign aid .

onJ.y .""W w.2,ilion i:.; for ?o1llt 4 aid and ~700 million for dev'elop~

cent loans.

By contl'ust V<::. billion :1J for

:0 ::.;hort,

111 OiU'

a,~d-prugra."U

pol~ciefi;

i.-C

~ ... tary

aid and.

~t'OO

illil.lion for

vill. do '\-Tell to recogn.izc still another illusion

~ely,

tl:.at tae vact

cf a Y..1nd. which nccc:::.sarily

build~

w:lOunt~

(Jf aid now beins spent is

couditions of pence.

By far the larger

chore, as I noted, ..;crvcs primarily tv hold existing I.>ituationo as they
arc and only a relatively s>:lall proportion boes into the constructive cf-

fort uhicl1 is c3ticnt.iul in ASia, Africa and Latin America if we ere to
ha.ve a reliable peace .
!.fu.uy Membel'S of Congress wilo recognize the importance of foreign

ald in the conduct of' o:..;.r foreign relations have been pressing for years
to bring about reforms and refinements :i..o this progrBI!l..
and

We have sougb,t

we will seek agaio to consolidate fully the functlono of the cid-

agency with those of the Department of ..,tate.
seek again to give added

to economic aid as contra;;ted with mil1-

..e have so-..ght l:.nd we -,:ill seek agc.Ll to oubstitute as far as

tary aid.
possible

e~ho.sis

We have soUGht end we \rill

lonz~terill

l0.'lls on easy terms for large grants of aid .

ilc have

tought and we will seek again to protect and advance the Point Four concept> thAt

;i.O,

the

:pcOl?1e-,to~peoplc

type of technical assistance .

\-Ie have

sougb.t and we will seek again to bring about an united aid-effort which
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COpy

draws increasingly on the cooperation of Western
recent progress has been

$'..:tch

~Urope

and

Ja~an,

whose

9S t- enabll! thcQ. to assume a much larger

share of the initiative and the cost of assisting the less-favored nations .
Discriminating changes in any major gc)"<,rernmental. unde...""'taking such

as i'oreigo aid are

ha-~

to bring about by action from Congr'ess .

t;~e

ca::l

alter legielation as we have done, or pa;1s n0'lf legir.lat1on, but in the
last

ana1ys1s~

effective change depends even more on the ad1:J.inistrat1on

uhicb. haa the responsibility for giving effect to the lalf .

In this connec-

tioa, I wuld call. to your attention the fact that en two se:garate occasions

1:1 the pa5t Congres3 'roted to ab11su tile ald-8.c.--enc:r and tau-n its functions

over to the Department of' State and the DCT1a.r-...ment of Defense .

And tllO

times th1c action uss reversed by the Administration uhich 1 on each 00,.
casion, reconstituted the aid-agency under a different na:lle.

Despite auch

setbacks, some progress has been lil8de in streamlining and ioprov1n.g the
administration of the

~id-?rogram.

The a1d-progroo.
as a whol.e .

i6,

but t.'Ulch still rerta.1ns to be done.

in many vaYfJ, typical of

0'.1.r

foreign :!'olicieo

The problem. of' bringine aoout effective f'ore1en relations lies

not so much in um, policies and Uel-1 machinery as it docs in sh.e.rpening
existing policies and refining eXisting maChinery .

The absence of clear-

cut, attainable objectives and the oorib...md adrrln:ttration of the aid-program-Sf> e. recent Uem to study of the prt)gran in Viet N3.m made clear--are

cipal waknc3ses in foreign aid.
in our foreign policy as a. whole .

Jo, too, are thCGC factors of' "calmeS6
I have no desire to ninitl1ze the tasks

of the President and Secretary of' State in these matterG.
exacting responsibility .

~rin-

Nevertheleas, it seem::; to

tle

Theirs is an

that there is a

,

-

t2.1C

:?ac~ ...

0:': ti.le d':'vi:.>:'on;:; .:.._ Asia no le .... .:; than th03C ia U'lroj?c .

to t;l.i.nk allCW ;;"'1C cost.;.y and ':'n...:.ftt::ctive c ... fort

tiOil e.G it

:~1:; .!.ti.

the

of the aid··cffort. :i.n
i.a-.;ln kaerica.

~1idd.lc

ll.sia~

...,ast .

~ic

~rcly

'de n.eed

to kee,p the situa-

need to rccocn!ze fully the defects

no L:6;'; than in ur. c:..mrG011t Africa and in

'i:e need to rU.Ill:pcn

v ..1C

pol::c:LcD by wi1.i.ch ,·re deal ,ri".;;h

the..:;c .I.,roblclIll.i ... in ;.;hc hO.l:'G toot 1.;..10 _ll'ublUI,u; uw:y begin to yield to practico.l oolution.

In shart, ne need a nc,.

dctcl"lina~_o;,}

and a ueo.. approach to

lackada::acnJ. and dangcrou=. ::'llU.S;i..oll I)f peace to. £a:us t.:1C reality of 1-cc.ce .

,

•

THE STATE OF OUR FOREIGN REIATIONS

An invitation such as you extended

to come home .

to me is an invitation
,

It is an invitation to think through old

,~

the fresh but familiar perspective of this vonderf'uJ. part of the

nation .

.

Of these

compelling .

~~Of foreign relations •

As Americans

r

need to understand the .

~,;x;.-

A. because DOne of us escapes their consequences.

N>-

most

problems

i

rr

As teacbers --I

am stili one of you although my membership in the club has

temporarily lapsed--as teachers),{e need not onl,y to understand
these problems but also to stimulate the capacity of others to
understand them.

We need. especla1.1y to convey something of their

meaning to the young people who must live in the world which our
foreign policies now are doing much to shape .
Let me say, at the outset , that foreign relations are

not the products of alchemy .

human acts .

They are the consequences of

As such they are not beyond normal human comprehension .

I
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To be sure, the conduct of foreign relations is largely in the
hands of specialists and that is as it should be.

But in a nation

such as ours, the work of these specialists needs the understanding
and broad guidance of our people if it is to be done most effectively.

Foreign relations arise because each nation in the world,

as it comes into contact with others, has its hopes, its interests,
its fears .

Each expresses these national drives in its foreign policy .

If the policy is effective, it advances the hopes and interests of a

nation, not at the expense of others, but by the process of reconciliation and accommodation.

sides.

In so doing, it mitigates the fears on all

In so dOing, it acts for peace .

To put it briefly, an effective foreign policy is one which
serves national needs in a complex world, a world. of mauy nations and
many needs, by methods other than those of the jungle.

l
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How

~

do we grasp the essence of these matters?

we convey an understanding of them to others?

How do

These are questions

which have preoccupied me for some time, particularly in anticipation

of this meeting with you who are specialists in the process of under -

;,,1-,

standing the complex and. helping others to learn to understand ~

P2

r'

It seems to me that we do not begin to appreciate the
dimensions of the problems of foreign relations, if we employ as yardsticks such familiar terms as isolationism or internationalism.

These

are ambiguities of the past and they do not help us in the pr esent.

As

far as isolationism 1s concerned, I think. that, as a nation, we have

long since recognized the impracticability qf a policy designed to 10-

sulate ourselves or even the Western Hemisphere from the massive currents
which flow through the wor ld and the storms which beset 1 t.

The military

conflicts, three in the lifetime of some of us, have dispelled the
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illusion of isolation.

As a lOOre recent reminder, if any 1s needed,

I call to your attention the Soviet test rocket which dropped into
the Pacific some weeks ago.

left a launching

pad

It landed about an hour after it had

almost 8,000 mdles away.

I do not think it is necessary to labor the point.

It 1s

clear that, for better or for worse, we are in and of this world or,
in these days of space exploration,
this universe .

per~s

I should say in and. of

It is obvious that it will be for worse rather than

better i f we close our eyes to that fact or try to pul.l the cover over

our heads to shut out that fact .

I do not say that

¥.a-

~

urge to isolationism, this urge to

"

escape from rea.l1ty 1s gone entirely from the nation.

It 1s there

to some degree but 1 t is no longer the principal source of our
difficulties in foreign relations .

The present problems
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r'pdepstaaJiag comel'more, I believe, from a rather widespread belief
that all which is C}aSSir;a.ble as internationalism has, per se, a
special claim to virtue.

The fact is there are no panaceas in an indiscriminate em-

brace of internationalism anymore than there is escape in isolationism .
That is the point I wish to stress most strongly.

Let me illustrate it

by a story which, since you are teachers, may shock you but a story

whose meaning will not be lost on you.

As teachers we know, I think,

...,
better than most, of the immense value

~

our relations with other

of improving our abilities in foreign languages .

nat1on~

In recent years, the

teaching profession has given great emphasis to the study of languages
and the government has taken steps to encourage it.

sirable development.

That is a most de -

What we may overlook in our present enthusiasm

for this great tool, however, is that it is on.ly a tool.

~----

__
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It 1s not a fool-proof guarantee of effective foreign relations.
The story with which I wish to illustrate the point 1s that of an
American diplomat 1n Latin America some years ago.

He made public

statements which did a great deal. of damage to our relations with
that part of the world.

Yet he spoke these statements 1n perfect

Spanish of w'hich be was a 1Il8.ster.
by his knowledge of Spanish.

The Latin Americans were astounded

They were even more astounded and, 1n

add! ticD, were infuriated by what be said in Spanish .

Obviously,

here was a case where our relations might well have profited from someone with rather less capability of conmunicatlng in that l.angua.ge.
As it 1s with l.a.nguages, so it 1s with policies of internationalism 1n general.

It by no means follows that if five American

military bases abroad are helpful, ten will be doubly helpful..

no means follows that an aid-program which costs $5 billion a

It by
~ar

will
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be 5 times more useful than a program 'Which costs $1 bUlion.

It by

no means fol..l.ows that if' 20 American representatives are doing an

effective job in a country in Asia, 200 representatives will increase
the effectiveness by a factor of 10.

It by no means follows that each

additional agency added to the United Nations system will increase the
total. contribution which that useful system makes to peace.
in any category of action,

In short,

~ -"fc..t....~
~.J
.Jeslii1'J~ international" it 1s

f

possible

not only to go beyond the point of diminishing returns but even to the

J.,."..
point of increasing'

ge.

What I am suggesting, then, is that we need to divest ourselves

of the notion that all policies, all acts automatically are to be
•
sanctioned if they are ClaSSifiable under the general heading of interI

oatiooalism.

There can be illusions no less misleading, no less dangerous

to the hopes and interests of the nation in this generalization than those

which appeared at an earl.ier time in the guise 01: isolationism.
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The basic problem of maintaining effective fore 19n relations
and of buil.di.ng peace, insofar as we can contribute to

in more policies or

DXlr~chinery

it, lies not

~ ~

but in giving :fresh direction to

existing policies and in refining the machinery by which these poli-

~

cles arel'fUXSUed. o If we would. meet this problem. we need, first, to

see the world as it ls.

We need to see i t as it 1s now, before we

can reasonably hope to see it as we should like it to be.

We need to

see our present policies as they are, rather than as we imagine them to

be .
No illusion in our present understanding of the world 1s more
misleading than that which assumes that there has been peace since a

truce was signed. in Korea in 1953 .

To equate the present situation in

that country or, indeed in most parts of the world. with peace, ma;y well
be to equate it with the period of 1940 in Europe, the period of the

- 9 -

so-called "Phony War" just prior to the German drive into the Lowlands
and France or with the state of Japanese-American relations on the eve
of Pearl Harbor.

If it 1s enough to define peace as the immediate absence of
gun-fire then I suppose the present world-situation, on the whole, may

be so regarded.

But if peace means to you what it means to me, a

reasonable assurance that the young people whose education is now in
your charge shall have an opportunity through that education to develop

their potentialities and to grow into constructive maturity without the

ever-present prospect of sudden and immense devastation being visited
upon them, then the present situation cannot be defined as peace.
have a long way to go to peace.

We

To create the illusion that we have

already arrived at it is to do a grave disservice to the nation.

That,

may I say, is one of the principal dangers of goodwill tours and meetings
at the summit, whatever advantages they may offer.
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We shall not achieve peace by studying the applause meters
or the comparative Hooper ratings of Mr. Khrushchev aod Mr. Eisenhower
in Iodia or France or wherever else they may visit.

The road to peace

does not lie in the winning of international. popular! ty contests.

Rather,

it lies in a reduction of the fears which push nations and systems of
oations towards military clash.

It lies in a frank. recognition of con-

f11ct1ng nat1oo.a.l interests and ideological hopes and, if they cannot be

reconciled at this time, in turning them away from the channels which
lead to the nuclear destruction of a recognizable civilization in the
world.
If we scan -at'

1.'

the principal regions of the world we shall

be a1le to discern quickly that there 1s no peace in this sense, but,
instead, a series of points of potential conf'lict .

In the Far East, theJe.-

points are to be found in Korea, in the Formosan Straits and in Indo-China.
In each of these areas, a truce written or unwritten prevails.

The truce
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conceals but it does not heal the ideological and. political divisions

which plague the Korean people, the Chinese people, and the people of
Viet Nam and Laos.

In the csse of Korea, the 38th parallel is still

guarded 24 hours a day on both sides.

In the Formosan Straits, Chinese

communist guns fire from the mainland at the outpost islands of the
natlonal.1atsnat Quefmoy and Matsu--every other day.

In

Indo-Ch1na~

in Laos" there was a narrow escape from a large-scale conflict just a
few months ago and the situation remains unstable.

In Viet Ram a rigid

division separates the communist north from the free south and shows no

signs of closing in peace.

In short, throughout the Far East, there exists, in excess,
one of the most common precipitants of war--unnatural political divisions
of peoples "'bo are in reality deeply united. by culture, by geography and
by history.
divisions.

I shall not review the circumstances which brought about the
All of them, to be sure, are overlaid with the ideological
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schism

":£!E'rt. 'h

between

communiS"U1

and freedom.

too, has its owo local characteristics.

But each division,

It 1s to these characteristics

00 less than to the broader ideological question which we must look if
there 1s ever to

.. 4t'" .J... \ ..~\ '" .It... ,.m;.;:t: • ..r.......,. , -t........)
be~a

chance

tion of a stable peace.

for~1

to evolve in the direc-

That refinement of the problem in policy has yet

to begin.
Until it
towards peace.

beg1n~a

basis does not exist upon which to proceed

An;y suggestion that our poliCies have actue.lly produced

peace 10. these areas 1s gravely misleading.
'Which sooner or later,

~~""_l!aS~g4!~i"S"'IOii\M

It obscures the problems

~~

,..

may weli engulf not only those

peoples immediately involved but the world and ourselves as a part of' it.
What auY-policies have done 80 far is to buy time in the Far
East.

We have spent billions through the deployment of our own armed

forces in that region and through aid-programs to hold the line against
a communist advance.

Thousands of American and other lives were
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sacrificed to the same end in Korea.
~_
so far is to buy time

'"

.)(.....

But I repeat:

/1..Ir .

all

we have done

oo~o~t""b~"'~1~Q4p~e~.~c~e'--'juD,-,t~h~eW~~..,~""E~g~.......

If we look elsewhere in ASia,

a±ea~

J.,

the SOaChexu

China, we find still another common cause of conflict.

~oldela

af

We find a nation

~ I.) IJ........,.)
recently revived from a long slumber induced by an inner decay and by

"

outer pressures upon it, now being revived under the forced draft of a
militant totalitarianism.

This revived China tests its new found strength

in an aggressive and brutal probing into territories of its neighbors.
The China of today is a China which 1s vastly different -- so far as we

can judge, for our information is all second-hand--from the China to which
we were allied during World War II.

It is a China in which tens of millions

of young people are coming of age with no direct knowledge of Americans
but with an induced hatred....
C''''. ._IIIIIIoI.....
i. of this country and its institutiollS.
Let no one underestimate the long-range effect of these years

u..-...
of animosity between ourselves

and~.

It is, to say the least)
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illusory to talk of peace while the animosity is present A It is illusory

to talk of peace wi tb a China on the march, not in the paths of progress

~

by accommodation with other nations but in the ancient way of Empire WDteh

'sa.

h ... ':-

~iern

totalitarian trappings .

I do not say that

this development-- this emergence of a new and bristling Ch1na- -1n the
heart of Asia must lead inevitably to war.

I do say that I see little in

it or in our policies with respect to it which warrants the assumption

that we are at peace .
Moving westward to the Middle East J here, too} we find. a

situation which by
peace .

DO

stretch of the imagination can be identified as

Rather, it is a situation of suspended war.

On repeated occas -

10ns in the past, the suspension has all but ended in grave bor der clashes.
On two occasions, at the time of the Suez crisis and in connection with
the Lebanon c r isis, the world dangled with one foot over the brink of
disaster.

Our political intervention at the United Nations in connection

with tb.e Suez crisis may have fo r estalled a total collapse in the Middle
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East ,at f!' C bi:w::.

the same effect.

Our mill tary intervention in Lebanon may have had

But Communist penetration of that area--econom,ic and

political--has not been curbed nor has a basis for peace been established.

The Eisenhower doctrine on the Middle East was intended to help
achieve both objectives .

So, too, have the enormous sums of public fUnds

which have been spent on various kinds of aid to

that area.

Yet both have

proved remarkably ineffective.

:-

5

It is conceivable that we may have helped to hold back the
I~

flood-waters of coni'lict in that region by our ae,j

~ aid,

but

we have done little if anything to disperse or to rechannel. them construc-

.....,.,
tively.

And behind the barriers which our

POllcieS~have

the flood-waters are accumulating in a dangerous fashion.

Each outbreak

in the Middle East appears less controllable than its predecessor.

In

these circumstances it Is, to say the least, illusory to talk of peace.
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If there is grave instability in the Middle East, the same 1s

true for Africa.

New forces are at work in that cCIlt1nellt which we are

just beginning to recognize in policy, let alone understand..

For decades Africa

{:t::~ upon rather than a region

w h1eh acted in international. relations.

Since the end of World War II J

however, 7 new nations have come into being in Africa.
add! t1onal.

5 are scheduled to achieve independence

in due course.

This year, an

and more will follow

This euol"lIJ:lus and rapid political change alone 1s suffi-

cieat tdfr1ng about massive probleIllS of

~adjU8tment.

But it is not only

~ political X::::::hiCh rumbles through that great continent.
Other forces common to all the underdeveloped nations J from Eastern Asia
to Latin America, are felt no less strongly in Africa.

fof::'n:J,:::l,~irmodernization,
'"

. r'""-

social benefit to all peoples.

The urge 1s there,

with its promise of ecocomic and

The urge 1s there, but the means to satisfy

it adequate:have yet to be devised either
I'

selves or 1n concert with others.

~ the African nations them.-
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Again, Africa is in danger of being more acted. upon rather

than acting itself in international affairs as it finds itself 10-

oJr-fi" .... ·
creasingly the focal point of rival ideOlogies" This competition

for African favor m8lf be flattering to the Africans for the moment but
it contains accumulating dangers to them and. to peace.

The dangers will

be curbed only as Urica, increasingly, finds its own way in the world,

~ ~.

largely by its own genius4\ I venture to say that if the continent is

not sidetracked by the blandishments from outside during this tranSition,
if it does not become

~

/mct<with the strong new wine of national inde -

pendence, it will in due course make an enormous -and

i~

contribu-

tioD. to the progress of mankind and to peace.
I should note in this connection that with the political transi-

tieD. in Africa, the composition of the United Nations General Assembly 1s
c hanging in a fashion which assures a decisive voice to the Afro -Asian
nations .

As you know, it 15 in the General Assembly that expression is
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given to world-wide aspirations.

We can hope that the Afro-Asian nations

and this nation will more and more see the problems of peace and. freedom

.

in similar perspective and that

~iCe_ will be

raised in

ba:rmony~

o-,--J .
That 18, however, by no means a certainty.

If much depends on the manner

'"

in which the African nations develop and use their newly achieved freedom,

,..,..

much also depends

OD.

the visd.om.d' E S)qatls; and the sensitivity of the

policies of the older f r ee nations towards the changes which are taking

place 10. the emergent African continent.

Much closer to home are the problems of peace in Latin America.
Notrlthstand1ng the President' 6 recent goodwill tour we are still faced

with the need for harmonization of Latin American interests with our own .
Beneath the facade of Haaispherlc unity there are deep divisions and. much

dissatisfaction part1cul.a.rly in economic matters.

Fortunately, the present

state of our relations with Cuba is not typical of our Latin American relations.

But, then, neither was the very warm welcome extended to President
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Eisenhower in 8JlY way typical.

As a man of goodwill, Mr. Eisenhower

invariably evokes a response of goodwill.

A firm basis for sound.

~

relations J however J 1s not conJured up out of IfiS
than tva-weeks duration.

"journeys of less

Such journeys may open doors but the problem

of keeping tbem open 1s one of follow-through in policies.
It seems to me that the need now in inter-American relations
1s a broad movement forward to new and higher grounds of hemispheric
understanding and cooperation.

We need this development 1'0. lnter-

American education and cul.tural. exchange no less than in defense.

We

need it in economic matters no less than in political questions.

And

~~

if our great neighbor to the North, Canada, 1s 60 inclined, we o@oald

7

its participation in any and all matters of Hemispheric interest.
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Unless this movement forward begins soon and 1n earnest, I am afraid

we

~ antlciPat~n

this hemisphere whose solidarity 1s an essential

of peace, at worst, more sharp clAshes in the present Cuban pattern and

at best, a

ste~

erosion of hemispheric intimacy which will increasingly

drain inter-American ideals of their substance.
Turning next to Europe, we find there, too, an illusion of

peace which masks deep and dangerous divisions.

That is particularly

the case 1n Germany but it is also true of the entire continent which
1s split assunder by the ideological cleavage.

Across the chasm only

rickety bri dges of contact are lIlalntalned.
If' there 1s a need for progress towards unity in the divided

countries of Asia, there 1s a compelling need for progress towards unif'ication in Germany and for a growing reconciliation between Eastern and

Western Europe.
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Until recently, at least, our policies on Europe had remained.
unchanged in essentials for a decade .

~

We have engaged 1n a vast hOlding

"

action in the fear that tbe Russians might attack Western Europe, a fear

W--~-~J.wl

-..:t vi th the ~ope that sooner or later the Russians wou.l.d. wi thdrav from
Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe.

To that end, we spent billions to

rearm Western Europe and to maintain our forces in that region .

The

RUSSians, s1milarly, have ensaged in a vast holding action--an action in

the expectation that Western European freedom vould. falJ. pr ey to communism.
and an action to hold

OD.

to a dominance in Eastern Europe which they had

obtained in consequence of World War II .

To that end they have kept

military forces 1n the Eastern European nations and rearmed those nations
and, until the advent of Mr . Khrushchev} minimized contacts between East

aM West.
It IJncreaSingly clear that these policies have not led to
the achievement of the aims of the one side or the other.
grip

~

~ no

The conmnmis t

signs of veakening in . . Eastern Europe and freedom bas
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come back with great vitality in lIestern

nOW' pursued. bave not led to peace.

Europe.1fertai~'

the policies

They have been, on both sides, holding

actions which have produced, at best, an unstable truce based upon a
Germany split inside the larger spllt of Europe.

That the truce is highly

..,..0unstable 4!e indicated by the :first German crisis last year.

This crisis

~"o-Jr of
"d

7? "

the

mere announcement that the Russians intended to

change one factor in the Situation; that 1s, to withdraw from Berlin and.

the routes of access to the c1 ty in :favor of the East German conmunists.
It 1s ironic that a Russian announcement of a withdrawal, of all things,

should produce a crisis; yet it did so, for the move threatened to upset

the present delicate balance which depends, with equal irony, on the continued Russian presence in Eastern Germany.
In the round of goodwill tours and conferences, the Russians

were persuaded to remain a while longer in Berlin and Germany and the
crisis eased.
poliCies

The source of crisis, hovever, remains in the outdated

~a&6

• 1ibdtbl'4S of both sides in Europe.

In short,

the tours and conferences have served as safety valves but I need ha.rdl.y

- 23 emphasize the danger of relying indefln1 tely on safety valves.

Sooner or

later, it will be necessary to come to grips in a practical fashion with
the problems of a divided Germany and a divided Europe.

The visiting

back and forth, notwithstanding, the promise of peace will be illusory
until the divisions in Germany and Europe begin to close in peace on the

basis of policies attuned to today's realities rather than yesterday's
expectations.

In the same fashion, the problem of control of armaments- -

armaments of massive destruction in particular--must begin to yield to
tangible solution before we can talk of peace in any meaningful fashion.
We have watched. the mathematical progression in the development of the
megaton-power of these weapons since the end of World War II.

The RUSSians,

the British, no less than ourselves, have advanced from a capability of destroying cities to a capability of destroying nations, to a capability of
destroying civilization.

The number of nations able to produce such weapons

has increased from 1 in 1945 to 4 in 1960 and is subject to further increase

/M>

if other countries who have the capacity decide"to deploy their science, techno-

logy and energy.

The missiles of delivery have improved, from the crude

but destructive V-Bombs which carried devastation to wndon in the
closing days of World War II to those which encircle the moon and. the
sun in 196o.

All the while the wisest humans among us, the most compassionate humans among us have warned the world of what it is about in
this deadly race for greater and more certain means of human annihilation.

All the while, there have been d.isarmanent conferences in which

these words of the wise have been echoed with a remarkable nnanimity by
all nations.

Yet a decade and a half has passed aOO. we have yet to

achieve a single agreement, signed and sealed, for the control of
armaments .

I do not wish to minimize the difficulties involved in this

process but surely there is something amiss, something illusory when all
endorse the warnings of wisdom, when all. agree on the extent of the
danger to all and yet agreement is not achieved which makes possible

~~

even the beginnings of a beginning on this critical problem.
~
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In 1955, I suggested that a summi t conference be held on the
one question of ending the1est1ng of nuclear weapons.
we may be au the verge of such a conference.

Five years later,

If it can now produce this

one achievement it will mark a major, if long- delayed, step forward.

Im-

portant as it would be, however, this achievement will be but the start
of a long roaiL

Until there exists a firm pattern for the progressive

extension of international control over armaments we will do well not to
speak. of peace as prevailing inthe world .

This pattern, moreover, is not

likely to be established until the political

differenceS~d~viSions

which I have been discussing begin also to yield

,

to~act1C~1~
"

~ JI.--. '->-..t.......)~

I mBlf be wrongr-J hope I am wrong but I see little likelihood that the

~

~eSSion

of the disarmament conference

~r

iii; !lregzeeos in Genevajanymore

than its innumerable predecessors, will lead to any agreement of substance.

r

is, 1: Aid, a1l6tl'ier

case

ot aUI! cart b!fbil)@ thXJafIl' a.
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If I may summarize, then, let me say that the United States
has made, 1n the past decade ......
l _ _ _C, a va.st international effort.

That effort has helped to keep open the prospect tor peace but it has

not yet begun to produce. conditions of peace 1n a:tlY significant degre~ •
In no single instance 1s this more evident than 1n foreign aid.

We have

made available for such purposes, funds approaching $100 billion since
the end of World War II .

The great bul.k. of this aid has gone to restore

the damages of war or to

~tary me~The

hO~

existing a1 tuat10ns against deterioration •

.../
positive aspect of aid as it 1s currently ex-

pressed in the Point Four Program of technical cooperation and in loans
for modern development has

been~

part of the total a1d-

program ever since the Marsb.a.l.l P.la.n came to a successful termination.

In the current year, for example, the President has requested $4.1 billion
for foreign aid.

Of' this total, however, only $200 million is for Point

4 aid and $700 million for development loans.

By contrast $2 billion

is for military aid and $700 million for military-related defense support.
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In short, we will do well to recogaize still another illusion in our policies ; namely, that the vast amounts of aid now being

"At.~~
spent is of a kind
~.

whiCh~uilds

conditions of peace tn the IIIi'3T J

By far the larger share, as I noted, serves primarily to hold

existing situations as they are and only a relatively small proportion
goes into the constructive effort which is essential in ASia, Africa
and Latin America if we are to have a reliable peace.

Many Members of Congress who recogaize the importance of foreign
aid in the conduct of our foreign relations have been pressing for years

to bring about reforms and refinements in this program.

We have sought
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and we will seek again to consolidate fully the functions of the a1d-

agency with those of the Department of State .

We have sought and we

will seek again to give added emphasis to economic aid a8 contrasted
with mil1tary aid.

We have sought and we will seek a.ge.1n to substitute

as far as possible long-term loans on easy terms for large grants of aid.
We have sought and we will seek again to protect and advance the Point

Four concept, that is, the people-to-people type of technical assistance.
We have sought and we will seek again to bring about an

1~e

•• a8i~

un! ted aid-effort which draws increasingly on the cooperation of Western

Europe and Japan, whose recent progress has been such as to enable them.
much larger

to assume a/share of the initiative and the cost of assisting the less-

favored nations.
Discriminating changes in any major governmen? \Uldel'taking
such as foreign aid are bard to bring about by action from Congress.

We can alter legislation as we have done, or pass new legislation, but
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in the last analysis, effective change depends even more on the administration which has the
law .

re~n8ibi11ty

for giving effect to the

In this connection, I would call to your attention the fact that

on two separate occasions in the past Congress voted to abOl:::' t~ ~
agency and turn it. functions

ove~to the D e _ n t of State", And two \ ~ •

times this action vas reversed by Administration

~

which, on each

'occasion, reconstituted the aid-agency under a different name.

Despite

such setbacks, some progress has been made in streamlining and improving
the administration of the aid program but much still remains to be done.
The aid-program is, in many ways, typical of our foreign policies

as a vhole.

The problem of bringing about effective foreign relations lies

•

not so much in new policies and new machinery as it does in
policies and refining existing machinery.

Sharpeniug.Pf'd

The absence of Clear-cut,

""'~

attainable objectives and the ••••~G680.~b~k~•••~'~,....

J . .
? .

'.'e administration

'.'~j"'.'. . .

..
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of the aid-program- - as a recent Senate study of the program in Viet Nam
made clear --are 1a principal weaknesses in foreign aid.
these

e 1

,W:::::s

~our

So, too, are

foreign policy as a whole.

I have

no desire to minimize the tasks of the President and Secretary of State
in these matters.

Theirs is an exacti1l8 responsibility.

Nevertheless,

it seems to me that there is a great need to look byond. and to act beyond.
the expensive holding action in which we are now engaged throughout the
vorld.

We need to

those in Europe .

se~ facts
"

..:t--

the divisions in Asia no less than

We need to think anew the costly

~ffectlve

merely to keep the situation as it is in the Middle East.

effort

We need to

recognize fully the defects of the aid- effort in Asia, no less than in
an emergeo.t Af'rica and in Latin America.

We need to sharpen the policies

Jt,.UL-

by which we deal with these problems, in

to practical solution.

b~

~1that t'*C~to

yield

In short, we need a new determination and a new

approach to foreign relations which will move the nation forward from this
costly, J.ackada1scal and dangerous illusion of peace

~al1

ty of peace.

FOR RELEASE THURSDAY P. M. 'S
APRIL 14, 1960

SPEECH OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

THE DEEPENING D1SCUIET

I make these remarks, today, to express what I believe to be a deepening disquiet in the nation.

It is as though we were passing through a stretch

of stormy seas in a ship which is obviously powerful and luxurious but a ship,

nevertheless, frozen in a dangerous course and with a hull in pressing need
of repair .
Let me say at the outset that I do not speak solely of questions of
national defense or of space - exploration.

To be sure there are grounds for

concern in these matters .
We will distort the problem, however, if we view it solely from that
perspective.
in its origins.

The disquiet, the deepening national disquiet, is many-sided
We shall measure it in full dimension only as we see the

multiple sources from which it derives.

We shall deal with it only as we

have the courage and the will to act as heart and mind tell us we must act
in the light of what we see .
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If the disquiet in the nation is due in part to apparent deficiencies of

national defense, it comes even more from a growing awareness that international peace is held together by a thread stretched taut.

That is the case

even though, as never before, the hopes for peace are universal.

That is

the case even though, as never before, the fearful price of another war is
accurately estimated everywhere in the world.

That is the case, even though,

as never before. the world is flooded with cries for peace and, indeed, with
deeply sincere efforts for peace.
Why, Mr. President '(

Why, despite these universal hopes, these

universal estimates. these universal cries, these universal efforts are we
no closer to peace?

For years we have answered this quest ion or thought

that we have answered it in a fashion that was at once simple and reassuring.
We had only to charge the Russians or the Chinese with keeping the goal of
peace beyond the outstretched fingers of mankind.

The evidence was enough

and more to brand these nations for their disservices to peace and so we
branded them.

We did it again and again.

But has it been enough, Mr.

President? Has it been enough for this nation? Has it been enough--this
simple formula- -for the human race?
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Do shortcomings elsewhere, though they be many. relieve us of the
necessity of facing our own :

Do shortcomings elsewhere explain why there

is so little to show for the enormous sacrifice for peace and national defense
which the people of the United States have made in these postwar years '!
I know, Mr . President, that it is regarded in some quarters as
fashionable to belittle that sacrifice .

It has been caricatured many times.

Let us not in the Senate, however, make the mistake of confusing the caricature with the character of the effort.

In a decade and a half, the people

of the United States, through the Congress, have appropriated $SOO billions
for the D efense Department and countless additional billions for related purposes.

They have made available foreign aid over the same period which is

now approaching a total of $100 billion.
These are not small sacrifices.

They are unprecedented sacrifices

for peace and defense, unequaled anywhere in the world.
priceless human sacrifices in Korea.

Add to them the

Add to them, finally, the searing

revolution of the soul which the American people have undergone and the
change which they have accepted in consequence.

That change, Mr. President,

is implicit in the move from a high degree of national isolation 2 5 years ago
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into the role of foremost exponent of the United Nations system and
of alliances and other international undertakings which stretch from
one end of the globe to the other.
No, Mr. President, let us not speak lightly of the burden
which the people of the United State s have borne on behalf of the
common defense of the nation and on behalf of peace .

The question

is not why have the people of this nation been willing to do so little

for defense and peace.

Rather, the question is why has not more

been done for defense and peace with what the people have been
willing to do?
Indeed, it is that question which is asked more and more
by the citizens of this ;'1.ation.

In that question lies one of the great

sources of the deepening disquiet in the land.

Glittering National Statistics vs, Human Realities
And there are other questions, many othe rs, from whence this
disquiet springs.

There are those questions involving the inner state

of the nation and its eConomic well-being.

It is difficult to raise these

questions without being reminded that ours is the most powerful and
affluent nation anywhere in th e world.
Let me say that I need no such reminders.

The power and

affluence are there and it is fortunate for us that th ey are there.
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The statistics make it clear. very clear, that we still are as we have
been, for decades, tbe most producing, the most consuming nation
t he world haa ever know.

That point is not at issue.

But if man does not live by bread alone much less does he
live by national statistics.

These statistics of vast national production

and vast consumption have meaning. ultimately. only in terms of
individual Americans and their families.

And where in these statistics

do we find the American family which struggles against the high cost
of living on an income of $3, 000 or $4,000 or less a year?

How

well does $3.000 or $4,000 a year or less take care of a family's
needs for food. clothing, shelter and medical services? How well

does $3, 000 or $4, 000 or less provide for the education of children
and for a measure of recreation?

Yet, in 1958, out of the 45 million

families in this nation almost 250/0 or 11 minion had incomes of
$3.000 or less and over one - third or 15 million families had incomes
of $4. 000 or less.

Are these families to bask in the reflected glory

of the nation's great economi c power and affluence or are they to
sense the deepening disquiet?
Probe the national statistics more deeply. Mr. President.
Put the question to those who live on an old age pittance or on
retirement incomes fixed years ago at far lower price levels.
member of the Senate does not know of these people?

What

Wbat Senator's
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mail does not bring every day. grim reminders of countless personal
tragedies of this kind?

The glitter of the nation's power and affluence

may obliterate but it does not alleviate the cl:squi e t of these Americans .

Nor does the power and affluence reach the mining families
of West Virginia or Montana, nor the textile families in Rhode Island
or Massachusetts, nor the men and women in many other parts of the
land where millions of wilting hands are held in pockets of unemploy-

ment or inadequate employment.

It does not matter much whether these

hands are stilled by automation, by shifting internal markets. by new
overseas trade channels, by resource underdevelopment or resource
exhaustion, by mergers, by recession-depression or whatever.

The

hands that are stilled belong to Americans, Americans stranded by
the vast waves of industrial change which sweep through the basic
economic structure of the nation and break suddenly upon one segment
or another of the people.

They are hands which belong to Americans

shunted aside by forces which are often beyond the power of individuals and localities and states even to comprehend, let alone control.
It has been said that these great forces of change contribute
to the welfare of all Americans.
by them.

The nation is made more powerful

The national statistics glow more brightly in consequence

of them.

That may well be true.

Inti me.

th e changes --
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at least those changes which tend to greater national productivity-undoubtedly bring with them attendant benefits.
what of the meantime?
back-lash of change?

Wh~t

But, Mr. President.

of those Americans who feel, now, the

What of those who will feel it in the near future

in order that all Americans may ultimately benefit?

For them, un-

fortunately, there is the disquiet today, sensed more deeply than
the golden promise of tomorrow.

State of Agriculture as a Factor in the Nation's Disquiet
I turn next to still another source of the nation's deepening
disquiet--to the state of American agricultuee.

We have great farm

lands, able farmers and brilliant scientists and technicians.

These

assets have been combined with mechanical ingenuity to create an
incredibly productive agriculture in this nation.

There is food in

abundance and for that abundance there can only be gratitude.
But, Mr. President, when government stimulates production
beyond abundance, beyond super-abundance, when it diverts the
e nergies and resources of the nation, insensibly. into the creation
of eve r-mounting surpluses, then gratitude gives way to disquiet.
It gives way in spreading doubt as to whether we know what we are
about.

It gives way in a growing public awareness of an enormous

waste of effort and resources and of the cynical subordination of
the welfare of the nation to the gain of the few.
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Whatever justification government agricultural subsidies -and let us call a spade a spade. for subsidies are what these programs
provide--whatever justification they may have had in the past, what
is their justification now?

The justification, now, can rest only

on insuring to working farm families an income sufficient to remain
on the land because we find in the family farm unit, beyond mere
economics, some special national virtue.
objective.

I do not question this

I question the manner in which it is pursued.

Instead

of preserving the family farm unit, the numb e r of farms in the nation
has declined from 5.6 million in 1950 to 4.6 million in 1959. a lo ss
of one million in a decade.

Last year, moreover. farm income fell

16.8 per cent despite a program which has cost the American people
billions of dollars to operate.
And still the surpluses accumulate.

The government. today,

owns or has under loan a total of $7 billion of agricultural products.
Storage and other handling costs alone may weLL exceed a billion dollars
in 1960.
!.n short. what began as a decent effort to preserve the
family farm has become a monstrous thing.

It has swallowed the

concept and is disgorging in its place a new get· rich-quick class
of government-subsidized farm industrialists and surplus-storage
operators.

- 9 Is there any wonder, M r. F-resident. that the disquiet
It deepens among those who seek only an adequate income

deepens?

in o rder that they may rem <:.in on the land.

It deep ens among all

Americans who see no benefit in the form of lower food prices for
the billions of public funds which have supported the agricultura l
programs.

It deepens among those who perceive the fundamenta l im-

morality of rotting stock-piles of food , even as human beings both
at home and abroad hunger for adequate sustenance.
State of Pub li c ,services as a Factor in the Nation's Disquiet
W ith the threat to peace and the prob lems of defense. with
the human dislocations brought about by rapid industrial and commercial change. and with the chaos in government agricultural programs,
we have still not exhausted the sources of the nation ' s disquiet.

We must

inquire into other spheres to grasp ita full dimension .
Ask, tv'.r. President. after our capacity to prevent the
stoppage of production in basic industries. such as steel . whether
such stoppages be due to labor - management disputes or to that which
is hardly less damaging to the nation , stoppages in consequence of
r ece ssion.

Note in this connection that steel production was 54.2

million tons below capacity in 1959 large ly because of a labormanagement dispute.

But in 1958. it was 55.5 millions tons below

capacity largely because of the business recession.
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Ask. too, particularly in the '". est, after the manner in

which the power. irrigation and other basic resource needs of our
own underdeveloped states are beine met, even as we recognize and

strive to fill such needs abroad.
Ask in the metropolitan areas, whether they contain 50.000,
500,000 or 5 million or more citizens. ask of the urban decay which
spreads its blight of slums and attendant evils, sp:ceads it faster

than rebuilding takes place.

Ask. too, of the strangulation of cities

in the toils of inadequate roads and transportation facilities and
the growing contamination of the very air that is breathed.

Ask of

the reliability of the nation's supp Ly of water, pure and simple. over
the next few years in the light of rising demand and of an industrial.
atomic and human pollution which more and more clogs the takes.
streams and rivers.
Ask, too, after the nation's children and youth and whether
or not they are receiving equal and adequate opportunity for education and sufficient cons tructiv e outlet for their energies.
Ask alter the mounting crime rate and the inadequacies ol
the machinery of law enforcement.

And ask alter the adequacy of

the nation's correctional procedures and lacilities.
Ask after the nation's sick, particularly the aged and the
mentally ill, of the vast human n eed lor care and cure which now goes
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unfilled and. in the face of it, the super¥commercialization of the
drug industry and the hospitals, if not indeed, of the medical profess ion itself.

Ask after the nation 1 s recreational facilities, particularly
in the crowded East--the adequacy of the wilderness areas, parks and
shorelines which must meet growing needs now and explosive needs in
the near future.

It was these areas which our late colleague.

the Senator from Cregon

(~'tr.

Neuberger), with great foresight and

dedication, sought to safeguard for all, for the future as well as

the present. against the inroads and depredations of the predatory
and the unthinking.
I know, Mr. President, these problems and many others of
the same kind have been with the nation for a Long time.

I know

that someone. somewhere--the states or the localities or private
citizens--someone is supposed to be taking care of these matters.
But the dangerous strains do not lessen;

they grow more intense and

these inner weaknesses mock the vast power and affluence of the
nation which can mask them no longer.
This nation has suffered a long night of national neglect
in its ordinary and essential public services no less than in matters
of defense and peace; no less than in its management of the implications of vast and sweeping industrial and agricultural change.
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t!!

of us who presur.,e to exercise leadership and authority share the

responsibility for this ne ;,lect.

That the responsibility is

L

ulti-

sided, however. does not exonerate those who exercise the hi ghest
powers in the land.

In this nation, whether it is reco c nized or not , it

is the Rderal Adn:inistration which sets the tone.

An d as the tone is

set so doc s the bell.
Forei gn Policy and the Nation ' s Disquiet
In no other area is the authority and, hence. the responsib ility
of the Federal Ad',:.inistration, '" Ore clear ~cut and a b solute than in the

conduct of this nation's quest for a dural:.le peace and adequate national
defense.

Individuals have not stood in the way here.

Nor have the

localities or States. Nor, in truth, has the Coneress.
A U that has been asked b y the Adrr. inistration for defense and
more has ,-'een provided.

V/hat has c.een honestly sou 3ht for foreign

policy has not been denied, including year i n and year out, the Presi dent's request for foreign aid.

If VIe have becon.e rr.ore reluctant of

late in '(:. atters of forei ;::.n aid, we have c ecor.·, e so only as the evidence
of a i rr.lessness, of i neffectiveness and waste in administration and of
political rr.ani pulation has accumulated.

I n spite of this reluctance, Mr.

President, I say a gain that the Ad a. inistration has had the cooperation
and the support of the Con gress i n aU decisive rr,atters of foreien
relations and defense.

-13 Far East
" ' hat has the Administration done with this cooperation and
supp ort?

Has it directed foreign relations in a fashion which has

closed the gap between the hope and the reality of peace?

Have we

really r£,oved closer to peace, even in Korea, as has been proclaimed
or ir.,plied over the year?

I am not aware that in Korea we did more

than convert the unwritten truce, which had prevailed in that country
for r.,onths prior, into a written truce, when i n July 1953, the Adn .inistration si: ned an agreerr.ent with the Cor•. munists .
To be sure. Arl.ericans are not now being killed in corr,bat
in Koreai that is a source of deep gratitude.

To draw relief frorr. a

truce in Korea, however , should not blind us to the fact that there
is no peace in Korea.

To call peace that which is no peace at all

is to n-.ake a ri. ockery of the sacrifices of those who gave so ,r, uch
in Korea.
The fact is that i i1 the seven years ....lHc.h have elapsed since
the si e ning of the Korean truce not one further step towards a durable
peace has "t een

ta~en

in that re;:,ion.

If there is any doubt on that score .

read the sterile deb ates at the United Nations on the Korean issue, year
in and year out .
scarcely at all .

The ideas do not chan c e .

Even the words change
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In short, the situation in Korea ren.ains as it was in 1953
except, so fa r as can be deterrl.ined. the Chinese are no lonc er
directly enGaged with lar ge nUlT.bers of n.il itary forces in that country
and we are.

The situation is, as it was, a ri, al<eshift, supported on

our par t by armed forces and by hundreds of tdllions of dollars of
aid fo r South Korea each year.

And I may add in this connection that

sorr,e of the recent re ports e,r.anating from that nation suggest- - to say
the least-- a

gr~ve

and shocking IT.ia-use of this aid.

If the re is not peace in K(S'ea, whe r e in the Far East is it
to be found?

At Formosa?

In Viet NaIT. ? In Laos?

tained in these places and others in Asia is tirr,e.

All we have ob-

We have obtained4

at the cost of billions of dollars in aid and a vast and costly deployment
of American m ilitary forces in the Far East.

And n . ore and rr.ore, Mr.

President. it appears tha t we have bou ght time only in order that we
may continue to buy tirr.e.
What has tinJe, this costly tirr.e. p roduced with re e ard to
the key action of China?

VIe have stood by while the Chinese Communists

have consolidated their pos ition on the Asi a1'\, n ,ainland and vastly expanded
their powe r until its use along its borders grows IT. ore arrogant and
a g gress ive.

- 15 '.vith a closed-eyes policy w e hav e done nothing more than reinforce our own official ignorance and diplomatic isolation with regard
to one of the most crucial areas of th e globe.

Thi s policy has not

brought about the downfall of Peking regime but it has made certain
that a new g e neration of tens of millions of Chinese will come of
age in this decade, with a high degree of hatred in their hearts for
this nation and its people.

Middle East
Have we done better elsewhere?
we closer to peace now than a decade ago?

In the Middle East are
Countless millions of

dollars of public funds have been thrown into currying favor with
this leader or that.

Time and again, we have seen this practice

blow up in our faces and still those who manipulate the policies
and administer the public funds do not learn.
For some strange reason, we have persisted in ignoring
the one course which might conceivably contribute to a duri'\ble peace
in the Middle East, insofar as it rests within our capacity so to
contribute.

That course is one of clear and consistent coopera-

tion with any nation in that area which is prepared to observe
a consistent pattern of responsibility and forebearance in the
face of the grave problems of peace in that area, a willingness
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to search

~

for peaceful and permanent solutions.

If that course

will not succeed, then I wonder at what strange reckoning we continue to pour millions upon millions of dollars of puQlic funds
haphazardly into the Middle East year after year.

This attempt to

placate the implacable, to purchase the cooperation of the uncooperative with resources of the people of the United f'tates is as immature
as the immaturity to which it is addressed.

Yet the attempt goes on

and on and there is not yet in sight an end to it. And peace--a
durable peace is no closer in the Middle East but even now, once again,

edges towards collapse.

Europe and Germany
Are the prospects better in Europe?

A foundation for peace

was built a long time ago in Western Europe, with the Marshall Plan.
with the practical initiation of the European movement towards integration, and with the whole encased in the North Atlantic Treaty
alliance.

Yet, this foundation can give way.

It can give way through

internal dissensions within Western Europe, and a failure to adjust the
institutions of Western unity to ever changing circumstances.

It can

give way in Germany and particularly over the issue of Berlin.
"nce again the force s of incipient conflict are rising at
Berlin to a point of naked and devastating confrontation.

Are we

more ready now in a diplomatic or in a practical military sense for
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the 2nd German crisis than we were for the 1st? Are we equipped in
policy with new and powerful ideas which mi ght hold the promise of
peace without appeasement?

Are we joine d with the Western European

nations in a deep sense of common purpose as the crisis approaches?
We are on paths to summits, Mr. President, but apparently. we have yet
to find the paths for continued Western unity and for a closing of the

division in Germany and Europe, a closing upon which peace ultimately
depends.
Underdeveloped Areas and Aid

If we are no closer to peace, a durable peace in Germany
and Europe, can anyone say that there exists the conditions of progress on
which a stable peace depends in the underdeveloped regions of Asia and
Africa indeed, even in this hemisphere?

The Administration uses words

of constructive challenge in justification of its request for billions of
dollars of aid for these areas each yea ••

But, Mr, President, they are

the words of a decade ago and they are tired words.

The same clarion

has sounded too many times and its notes grow feeble.

The inspiration of

the Point 4 Program of helping others to help themselves has been
exhausted in a labyrinth of bureaucracy and in an haphazard accumulation of activity for activity's sake.

More and more people at home, no

less than people abroad, cease to hear the promise and ask after the
results.

Still we go on and on largely in the same pattern of aimlessness

and endlessness that has persisted in this program since the Marshall Plan
came to a close.
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Arms Control
Nor are we nearer to peace, Mr. President, in the matter of
arms control.

Fifteen years of costly ne g otiation, within the United

Nations and without, have yet to yield one
of substance.

The

We make them.

~oviet

si~ned

and sealed a greement

Union announces cuts in its fighting forces.

In the most deadly fields of missiles and nuclear weapons,

the competition to refine the instruments of universal annihilation
goes on.

Nuclear testing is under a moratorium imposed by world

opinion but clouds, heavy with the rain of radio-active death, still
hang ominously over the earth.

Once there was one, then two, then three, and now four
members of the nuclear club.

The count -up is likely to continue as

the scientific and technical bars to membership come down.

More and

more fingers will probe the triggers of weapons of immense human destruction, weapons primed and reprimed to respond ever -mor e quickly.

****• ****
Mr. President, it is this panorama of a world, less, not
more peaceful today, in any real sense of the word peace, than it
was a decade and a half ago, which is unfolding its deepening disquiet
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in the consciousness of the people of the United States.

This grim

and cl ouded panorama spreads a growing public awareness that our
policy has become, less a positive search for peace and more a vast
and costly . holding action.

It is no wonder that the question is more

and more asked in the nation:

Why has not more been done {or peace

with what the American people have been willing to do?

National Defense and the Nation's Disquiet
Even as this que stion is asked in the realm of foreign policy
where the Russians or the Chinese still offer an excuse--in part
accurate and in part glib--for our own inadequacies and inertia, it
muSl be asked even more in matters of national defense .

end of a decade and a half of spending. 500 billion

At the

dollars later,

a half-trillion dollars later, we are now at a point where the gravest
uncertainties exist among those who should know, as to our military
capacity and readiness to defend ourselves,
What has been said in public, what can be seen with one's
own eyes and heard with one's uwn ears, is sufficient to persuade
me and, I believe, other Americans that there are grounds for concern,
deep concern over the operation of the national defense system, quite
apart from the Soviet threat, the Chinese threat or whatever,

There
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are grounds for concern which have to do with our own short-comings
and they cannot be dismissed by general reference to motes in other
eyes.
There are grounds for deep concern over our rate of achieve-

ment in space technology in a world which. for better or worse, in creasingly measures national competence with t he yardstick of advanced
scientific progress.

There are grounds for concern over the present

system of administration by which the vital questions of defense are
interrelated with the vital questions of foreign policy, the system by
which these questions are answered by decisions if. indeed, they are
answered at all.

The re are g r ounds for concern over the manner in

which the supposedly unified Defense Department is organized and
staffed to fulfill its primary functions of military defense at the direction of responsible civilian authority.

There are grounds for concern

over t he manner in which the Department of Defense handles the public
funds of the people of the United States.
What other conclusion can be drawn from the visible gaps
in space exploration?

What other conclusion can be drawn from the

wo4ds of experienced Americans who have been appearing before the
Special Committee on National Policy Machinery under the Chairmanship
of the able Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) which suggest that
the premium in this Administration is on the avoidance rather than
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the making of decisions by responsible political authority ?

Wh at

other conclusion can be drawn from t he conflicting testimony of
representatives of the Air Force. the Navy and the Army as they
push for appropriations for their particular service almost

a8

though the others were non-existent, almost as though it was incumbent upon each service alone to defend the nation without aid
or interference from the others ? What other conclusion can be
drawn from the revelations of the waste of enlisted manpower and
the abuse of the privileges of rank. the revelations which have been
made by Congressman Kowalski and others in the other House?
other conclusion can be drawn from the
theft')

What

--theol:i;:;;~~r

8$up.icb-training manuals of the D efense Department which

were recently brought to light?

What other conclusion is to be drawn

from what is, to 8ay the least, a careless regard for conflict of in terest on the part of many retired officers--civilian and military-now retained at high salary by firms whose primary business is selling to the Defense Department?

What other conclusion is to be drawn

from what would ha ve been, except for the pre88ures from Congress,
thel passing over for promotion and, hence, the retirement of one of
the most creative officers in the service--the adm.iral who was the
driving force behind the development of the atomic-powered submarine?
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What other conclusion can be drawn. when a decade and a
half after the urgency of World War II. seven years after the urgency
of theKorean Conflict, the Defense Department still places 80% of
its $20-$25 billion of procurement orders each year on the urgent and
extraordinarily expensive basis of cost-plus contracts without competiti ve bids?
What other conclusion can be drawn when we learn that the
Defense Department wrote off··got rid of--in 1958. $ ( ,5 billion of
its public as aets at a fraction of value?

When we learn that through

mistakes of judgment and what appear to be fantastic concepts of need
and obsolescence. the practice of write - off of assets in something of

this same magnitude, is repeated over and over each year and is likely.
when the figures are in, to reach $10 billions for 1959? Even the
mountains of surplus agricultural products rotting in the warehouses
at government expense pale into insignificance in comparison with this
waste.

Note in this connection that the British defense establishment

has a budget of only $4 to $5 billion annually.

In other words. the

British operate their entire military establisrunent--Army. Navy and
Air Force--each year at atolt hal! of the cost of the assets which our
Defense Department abandons each year. in short. at about half the
cost of what our military establishment--aToidably or unavoidably-wastes each year.

-23Mr. President. I do not know whether we need to keep a third,
as sorLe have suggested, or a half or two-thirds of the Strate c ic Air
Command aloft at all ti n es to insure our national survival.

I do not

know whether we need to convert the base n. ent playgrounds into bo n-,b proof shelters or otherwise to burrow into the E:artb.

as others have

sue gested, in order to insure our national survival.
I do believe. however , that we need decisions by the
responsible elected leadership rather than this airr.less drift either
through

mut~l

acco . .. modation or unrelated action a rr ong the swollen

bureaucracies of adn.inistration if we are to have even a chance to
assure our national survival in freedorr. ,
to bring about an alert,

I do believe that we need

strearr_lined and disciplined adrr.iniatration

of the m ilitary eatablishrr_ent if we a re to have even a chance of
insurbg our national survival in freedon _.
It is beco rr_ ine; cryatal clear that the iUs of national defense,

no les9 than those of forei gn policy, are not of a kind which lend
then_selves to cure by additional injections of doUars,
Concludin g CotT_ments
Mr . President, in givin g voice to these thoughts, to this
deepening disquiet which is spreading throu gh the nation, I said and
I say a gain that all, all who presume to exercise leadership

-24and c.uthority share responsibility for the present state of the nation 1 s

public affairs.

That is true of the local official, no less thaa the

state official, no less than the Congress and the
as the public power is not equally divided

SQ,

P'dl~.inistratio ,1.

But

too, is the responsibility

for the deepening disquiet in the nation not equally divided .

LL' the

rer.~a rks

which I an. now concluding seer., to apply r.. ore

pointedly to the Federal Governrr.ent a .1.d to its i :dr.1inistration it is

because the Federal Adrr.i nistration - -re ga rdless - Glf party--wields the
prin". ary public authority and occupies the citadel of national leadership.
That is clearly the case, as I have noted, in re e ard to IT.atters of
peace and defense.

It is more and more the case as re gards the

fib e rs of the public services which bind t0 3 ether the nation and safeguard its inner health and vitality.
This era, Mr.

President, bee-an as a crusade with the bright

pron.iae of change for the better.

It be gan with the prorr.ise of peacei

it began with an almost built - in g uarantee of r•. ore effective defense.
It began with the assurance of the new broom that sweeps clean .

This era, Mr. President, is ending with the broorr. still in the closet,
with the inner problems of the nation

accurrulatin~,

throu i h neglect

and evasion , at a rapid rate , a rate the IT.ore shaIT.eful because of the
vaUi"lted power

-25and affluence of the natio n.

This era is ending with the nation,

relative Ly , far less secure than it was fifteen years ago. Less secure
than it was a decade ago, still Less secure than it was five years ago.
This era is ending with peace, durable peace, still as elusive as

the Abominable Snow Man of the Himalayas, pursued from Summit to
Summit by one goodwill expedition after another.
Whatever is achieved in the remaining months one certainty
there is:

There wi ll pass to the next administration--Republican

or Democratic - -a monumental accumulation of unfilled needs for public
action.

The needs will not be met by crusades which crumble after

the first flush of political victory.

manipulation of words.

They wilL not be filled by the

They will be filled by an administration

which, with the cooperation of the Co ngress, accepts rather than
evades the responsibilities of the 2nd half of the 20th Century.
They will be filled by an administration which serves, equitably,
a LL the people of the United States.

They wiLL be filled by an admin-

istration which does more, far more, with what the people are willing
to do for peace and for defense.

They will be filled by an administration

which has the capacity to lead and the determination to lead, by an
administration which calls forth from this government and from this
people a new dedication to the unfinished work of freedom .

l·'or rdease TlJ,~':;day P .iL s
April 28, 1960

S'II1TEI·1El1r OF SElIATOR MIKE )t!\lISFIELD (D . , MOill'AilA)

BRITISH BWE STREAK CAlfCELU'rIOj!,
A lIEW OPPORTUlfITY FOR FREE iIATIOHS

l.fr .

President :
The British government has announced the abandonment of the Blue

Streak, its major missile-development project . According to the press, the
decision was based on such factors as enormous cost and the rapid rate of
obsolescence in the missile field.
This decision highlights a serious dilemna conf'rontins the t-lestero
nations.

At the same time, this decision may also point the way to a great

opportuoity for all.
The dilemna , Mr. PreSident, is that advanced scientific experimcntution and development in ..rhat might be called the field of Space and Speed has
outgrown the capacities in brain power, manpower and material resources of
almost any nation which seeks to pursue these undertakings on a unilateral
basis.

Yet national stature, indeed, national vitality itself, may hinge

to a large degree on significant national partiCipation in this most advanced

scientific activity .
The termination of the British Blue Streruc project, for all practical
purposes, leaves only the Soviet Union and the United States with major undertakings in the field of Space and Speed.

But the scope of this field is so

enormoua that we cannot and, I presume neither Can the Russians, regard its
ever-expanding demands for talent and resources without a measure of awe aod
concern.
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Ideally, 1 suppose, the resources of both nations--all nations - would be combined 1n a common endeavor to push back these common scientific

frontiers of Space and Speed.

tlh11e that time of cooperation may come, it is

not now.
The order of the day is still competition 1n these matters .

It is--

now that the British have w1thdrawn--an actual competition between the United
States and Russia.

But 1n a larger sense, it is also the symbolic and ultimate

test of the capacity of peoples to organize themselves for the progress of the
human race under a free political order in contrast with a communist system.
If the competition is seen in that larger sense, the present
organization of the free peoples must be recognized as poor and inadequate.
It 1s reasonable to assume that the Soviet effort in Speed and Space draws
freely on the scientific talents, not only of the Russian people but of the
people of Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Poland or wherever they may be found
within the Communist bloc .

By contrast, the effort amonS the free peoples is

coufined lar gely to the United States, with a sprinkling of foreign scientists
who can be prevailed upon to come and work for this country .

In short, the

free peoples are using only a fraction of their potential brain power in any
cohesive fashion in the field of Space and Speed .

In this connection we may

well ask what will happen to the able British scientists and technicians who
were engaged in the Blue Streak project now that it has been cancelled?

Will

their speciali zed talents be employed in meeting this highest challenge to the
capabilities of free nations or will they be diverted to other fields?
Similarly throughout U.A .T.O., in each of the member-nations, there
are scientists and technicians no less skilled than those of Britain or this
nation.

There are men and women in all of these other countries who are expert
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in propulsion, deslgn1 comruunfcatloDS, electronics, physics,

astrono~-- ln

the entire array of scientific specializations which are involved in Space

and Speed .

Are they being used to further the progress of the tree nations

1n the critical field of Space and Speed or are they diverted to other less
significant functions?

It is well to note in this connection that the initial release of
atomic energy was at least

8S

much the worl" of European brain pm-rer as it was

of our owo, for the two were merged and organized with great effectiveness in
the Manhattan project during tlorld \1ar II.

Without the contribution of this

outstanding group of Europeans that achievement might have been long delayed.
This, then, may be the great opportunity to wbich I referred at the
outset of my remarks, the great opportunity which the cancellation of the
British Blue Streak may have opened for the free nations as a whole.

That

cnncel..l.o.tion may bring home to us and to all the free nations the great
desirability, perhaps, the c0sPelling neceSSity of a joint undertwting.
What is called for now, I believe, is an initiative on our part which seeks
to bring about the mobilization of the advanced technical cOmpetence} the

facilities and resources, the scientific drive and enthusiasm wherever t hey
may exist in an effort to intenSify achievements in Space and Speed .
As I noted earlier, ideally, that effort should embrace all the
nations of the world and the door should not be closed to any natiOn which
will participate in spod faith in a common effort.

But if that cannot be

at this time then I see no reaSOn why those who are prepared to sp forward
jointly should not do so .

This nation, no less than others, will be better

off if the scientific devices which carry mankind's influence beyond the
earth's atmosphere bear the label of an ever-growing number of nations willing
to contribute to a common effort.

r
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Knowing something of the problem of organizing for scientific develop ment in Space and Speed within our owo government we should not underestimate
the difficulty in enlarging this undertaking to embrace others .

It may be

that, as a beginning, it should be attempted with Canada and the United Kingdom
but, there would be much to be gained if from the outset the effort could include the N.A.T.O . members and other nations.
I! we should not underestimate the difficulty of such a joint enter-

prise neither can we underestimate its urgency.

To those who cannot see the

handwriting on the wall, I respectfully sUggest that it is already written
large on the moon.

The question which may well be involved here, Mr . President ,

is whether the world is to spin as a dead planet in swift silence through

end~

less time and space or whether this brief human experience in freedom on earth
shall be carried to the stars.

MAIN FILE COpy
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WEST VIRGINIA ',s SON OF THB nAB
Sheraton-Park Bote.!
~

14,1960

I hope that West Virginia has room tor many sons.

In view

of the warmth and friendliness of your welcome to me I am going to

e,pply tor e.dDption.

I have no sanse of being an outsider here tonight

and perha,ps that 1s understandable .

For rrr::J meeting with you, topogra:;;lhi-

caJ.J.y speaking, is a l:d.tld of meeting of tbe mountains .

What West Virginia

is to the East in that r e spect, Montana 1s to the West .

Each state gives

character aD1 spine to its respective sector of the country.
I've heard somewhere that West Virginia 1s a wonderful. state
in which to work because if you get tired all. you have to do is stop
and lean on it.

Montana 1s sometlllng like that except that there we

can J.ean on it even when we are work1Dg .
Even as West Virginia aDd Montana share a conroon heritage of
countalns J the two states also share a cOIlIOOn her1 tage of great natural
resources and for that reason they are sometimes call.ed. Treasure States.
For those of us of these states, howver, the real treasure 1s DDt copper
or coal but f'ine, generous and friendly people .

We ebare another heritage--West Virginia and Monta.n.a.--a les6
pleasant heritage--the heritage of grave economic problema vhich grow
out of e. heavy dependence on a single industry.
to detail these prob2ema .

This is not the occasion

I ment'ion them. only by way of noting that we

are cl.ose not only in the sense of COO'IOOD. joys but also cOIlIOOn sorrows .
For, tonight, then I hope you "rill act favorably on my petition
for adoption 89 e. Son of West Virginia.

I file it because it takes an

ordinary son like ID¥seU to recognize an outstancUng son.

And to

recognize and to honor an outstanding eon of West Virginia is half of
the reason why we are gathered here tonight.
The man 'Whom. we honor as West Virginia I s son of the year begeo.
a long time ago the 'WOrk which was to merit him this great distinction.

The work began as soon as he had l.earned enough at SaJ.em College to teach
his younger brothers and sistere.

And for seven years, as a newspaperman

and educator he taught and taught well.

But that was only prelude to his coming to the Iiouse of
Representatives in 1933 .

From his seat there which he held for a long

timB--! found him enthroned as a senior 'When I arrived as a freshman in

l.943--f'rom his seat there he carried on his work 10. education.

Oaly this

time he was not educating rlest Virginians about the rest of the COWltry
but rather the rest of the country about West Virginians.

too, I

~

He did much,

add, during his service in the H0't.8e to make the District of

C01umb1a the 56th County of West Virginia.

So strenuous was hls--if I
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State m e nt of SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. Montana)

NEW HORIZONS FOR

THE AMERICAS

HOtD Fon R'Jr'~r
MONAUG

1>

A d m i nistr ation's New Aid-Prog ram for Latin America

It has been reported in the press that the Administration intends to

ask Congress during this session to provide $500 million in special aid for
Latin A merica.

There is no doubt of the need for some new action with re-

spect to Latin America.

Goodwill mission after goodwiLL mission to Latin

America during the past decade has come back talking of little else.

Ideas

along these lines have been expressed in Congress and by leading statesmen
throughout the hemisphere.
The question is not one of need.

The question is whether the Admin-

istration's program, as reported, meets the need.

And further, the question

i s whethe r it is appropriate at thi s moment to bring forth a new plan of aid
to Latin America.
If we may judge from the press reports. Congress is going to be

asked to approve some kind of blanket authority for the Administration to make
available $500 million for Latin America.
new approach to aid is to be anticipated.

The reports do not indicate that a
The reports suggest merely more

of the same sort of thing which we have been doing all over the world for the
past decade under the M utual Security Program.

Is this the sort of action that is needed? Will it bring about an end
to the steady erosion in hemispheric relations? Quite the contrary, Mr.
President, I believe that this new gesture in the old pattern, particularly at

-zthis time. may cause further damage to those reLations.

Integrated Economic Action Needed

What is needed, what has long been needed in inter ... American

reLations is an integrated effort to develop this hemisphere's great resources
for the benefit of all of its peopLes.

It seems to me that we require. first,

a reasonable meeting of minds in the Americas as to what needs to be done
and how it can be done.

We require a specific understanding with the other

American nations which will make clear how much is to be spent over how
many years, in what very specific ways and for what very specific, measurable ends.

Vie need a pLan that involves more than U. S. grants.

We need

a plan that is financed by all the participating republics in this hemisphere
in rough proportion to their capabilities and, may I add, that if some nations
cannot contribute cash to the pool, they can certainly contribute skips, com·
modities, and labor.

We need a plan, most of all, which involves a large

measure of initiative on the part of individual governments in mobilizing the
enthusiasm, cooperation. and sacrifice of their own peoples.

The approach

should incLude, if we would deal with the need in its full dimensions. not
merely financial and technical aid, but action on inter·American commodity
and trade problems.

And in this connection, 1 should like to suggest that the

approach should not omit consideration of the possibilities of a hemispheric
common market.

As the Senate knows, Central American nations have been

moving towards a regional trade grouping.
of the South American states and Mexico.

So. too, have some of the largest
Before the hemisphere is split

·3·

further into regions within regions, it wouLd be wise to consider action which
brings all the American nations together for marketing and other economic
purposes
I could be misinformed. Mr. President; it may be that this is
the type of program which the Administration expects to present to the
Congress in the near future.

1 hope that such is the case.

If it is, I am

confident that the Senate will be disposed to give it the most careful consideration.

Timing of New Aid-frogram

I should stilt be compelled, however, to question the timing. if
a new aid-program, however impressive it may be, is presented for action
during the few remaining days of the 86th Congress.

It is no secret, after

alt. that we are engaged in a serious and bitter dispute with Cuba at this
time.

It is no secret that this dispute is to be aired with the other American

republics in the Organization of the American States which is to meet within
a matter of days in Costa Rica.
I am sure that the Administration had no desire to tie together
the two matters
dispute.

~.

that is. a new

aid~program

for Latin America

and this

But it amazes me that the Adm inistration would permit this

coincidence to occur.
We must ask ourselves, in all honesty. how does this coincidence
look to the rest of the Hemisphere? I am afraid. l'v.r. President. that it
looks very bad.

It looks like a callous attempt to purchase favor in Latin

- 4 If we

Atnerica at a time when we are especially desirous of obtaining it.

are honest with ourselves. we will recognize that the announcement coming
at this time produces an erroneous impression.

It suggests that dollars

are being dangled before Latin America in the same manner that the
Russians of late have been waving rubles before Cuba.
in keeping with the dignity of this nation?

Is that impression

With the dignity of the other

American republics?

The need for action on hemispheric devetopment stands on its own.
So, too, does the need for a settlement of the dispute with Cuba.

We must

act on both but we must act in a fashion which makes it clear that we do not

Link them •• the two matters -- in any fashion.
Suitable Congressional Action

To keep these questions separate and distin ct. I wouLd strongly
urge the Administration not to try to ram through an aid-program for Latin
America of a specified amount during the few remaining days of this Congress.
If the Administration feels it would be useful, I can see no objection to a

resoLution which wouLd put this Congress on record -- in the manner of
the Vandenberg ResoLution some years ago -- as backing fully a common
effort with other American nations of the kind 1 have just described.

1

should. personally, be happy to join in sponsoring such a resolution.
Then. let the spokesmen of this Administration go to the scheduled meeting
of Hemispheric Economic Ministers in Bogota in September equipped with
new specific proposals.

Let them go prepared to listen with new attention

- 5 to old ideas such as those advanced by President Juscelino Kubitschek of
Brazil in his proposed Operation Pan America. to the ideas of Premier
Pedro Beltran of Peru. and of other distinguished Latin American Leaders.
Let them hammer out, in concert, over the next few months, the integrated
approach which is needed to replace the tattered pattern of more unilateral
technical aid

usual, more unilateral loans as usual, more unilateral

a8

grants as usuaL.

Let them put together a plan which will lift the sights of

all the Americas to a new concept of hemispheric cooperation.

If that is

done, if American participation is equitable and just and. if it is adequately
explained to the people of the United States, 1 would anticipate that the
next Congress will

be~cooperate

tion in its realization.

fully with the new Administra-

In that fashion too, Mr. President, I believe we

'\

can avoid any confusion of the new aid-undertaking with the United StatesCuban dispute which should be faced on its own merits in the Organization
of the American States.
The Cuban Dispute
As for that dispute, there are some matters of which we need
to speak frankly and honestly at this time.
away.

The dispute cannot be swept

Its implications will not disappear by beating the drums for a new

aid-program.

On the contrary, unless this dispute is faced and soLved

it may well nullify any effort for the economic advance of the hemisphere.

- 6U we are to deal with this dispute in the onLy context in which

solution now seems possible, that is, in the Larger context of inter-Ameri-

canism. we will have to recognize that the attitudes of many Latin Americans
will invariably include a measure of sympathy for Cuba and its revolution.
regardless of sentiments respecting its present government, regardless

of the facts of the dispute.

There are complex historical roots for these

attitudes and they will not change overnight.

'liv e must anticipate that voices

will be raised in the Latin American countries. as was the case recently

in Mexico, in emotional support of Cuba.

But that ought to be a cause neither

for aLarm nor condemnation in Mexico or the United States.

One must

question the wisdom of the Administration in 'calling il) the Mexican
Ambassador some weeks ago to explain a speech of this kind in the Mexican
Congress.

After all. it is customary for members of this body and the other

House to express their feelings, emotions and thoughts on Cuba and on other
matters in no uncertain terms.

And I am sure we would not look kindly on

the summoning of our Ambassadors by other governments to justify remarks
whenever they are made.

We can hardly censure in others what we extoLl

as a virtue in ourselves.
I am confident that if we exercise restraint with respect to the
emotional attitudes which the Cuban dispute has engendered. we can anticipate that the issues of the dispute wiLL be considered by the O . A. S. on
their merits.

They will be considered with objectivity and with full attention

to the larger interests of the Hemisphere.

-7-

By the aan.e token, I do not believe that the i.dm inistratio:1 in
its approach to this di spute ought to be confused by the loude st and
rr.ost emotional voices here at horr.e.
there is any widespread desire in this

1 do not and cannot

b e !i c v~

n a tion to throwaway the re-

maining fruits of the Good Neighbor policy by a unilateral rr.Hitary
intervention in Cuba.

This Adn .inistration is to be corr.plimented for

rc.aking it clear, as Secretary Herter did in a recent p ress conference,
that he had "never tallced with the Preside."!t about military intervention
in Cuba", nor had the Department "made any such p lans or p reparations!! ,

What is at stake is larger than Cuba and Castro and any hot

feelines in our oVln midst however noble and ri ghteous they may seem
to thos e who are possessed by them.

Vlhat is at stal(e is herr.ispheric

solidarity and that n .ea sure of peace and reasonable s e curity and the
highly fruitful corr.mercial and other contacts which this solidarity
has yielded over the years.

If the national attitude of this country could be expressed on
Cuba, 1 dareaay that it would b e less one of Tt.i1itant hostility than ona
of incredulity and disrr.ay that relations have de teriorated to their
current unhappy state.

Further, there would be indignation at the

incoTt,prehensible calumny which has been heaped q:on us. Finally,
there would be a firn.nes8 which

1 an. sure is shared by other

American states that the Soviet Union shall not fish in the troubled
waters of the Caribbean or rr.eddle in the fardly affairs of the America s, or un-ne rve us by v. avi · g its rr.issiles .

"

-8U".. 5". 'Position in the

a,A.s>.- on

Cubfln...Dispute ~._

It is a little late now to retrace events to the particular stones
on which United States-Cuban relations have stumbLed.

been rr.ade and they have been made on both sides.

Mistakes have

We have tried on

a bilateral basis to set these relations atiaight and we have not succeeded.

The dispute has come before the United Nations and that body has

wisely referred the n Jatter to the Organization of the American States,

In short, the U.N. has placed great trust and responsibility on the
An.ericas to meet an An.erican pr obLen. ,

The nations of the Hemis-

phere can periorrr. a great service by isoLating the basic issues betwe en Cuba and this nation, b y sobe rl y considering these issues, and
by acting to n.ee t them.
It seen s to me that this nation ought to bring to the in.pending

consideration of the disp ute more than mere justifications for its
sent firn . attitude with regard to Cuba.

pre~

That attitude needs no justifi.

cation in view of the hostility of the government in Havana.

What is

needed is a clear position which illuminates what it is, specificaUy,
that we de p lore and what it is that we seek in our relations with Cuba.
If we are to have that kind of position we must go beneath' the
angry words.

VIe must start with a recognition that the revolution of

the Cuban pe op le was not only unavoidable but to be welcomed. given
the oppression to which they had been subjecv,.d.

by the previous regime .

,
Indeed, at the United Nations. Ambassador Lo.lge has stated the p osition
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of the United States and the only official position on this n'".atter IT.ost
clearly when he noted the

lI

undcr standing!! and IIsympathy" of the United

States for the ain.8 of the Cuban revolution,

We must recognize, further, that the pron-.ise of the Cuban
revolution was change~ and that our own citizens and other outsiders
with significant intere ata in Cuba can hardly be insulated frorr. that

change.

Mr. Lodge has set forth the official views of the Adminis-

tration on this point.

At the U,N. he quoted the President directly as

recognizing the right of the Cuban government 'to undertake those
social, economic and political reforms which with due regard for their
obligations under international law, they think desirable",

We must

recognize final1y that, except as the actions of the Castro government
grossly outrage the conscience of the American Republics or threaten
their common security, the nature of the changes in Cuba is a matter
solely of concern to the Cuban people.

That is the crux of national

independm:e which the Cubans hold as dearly as do we.
It seerr. s to me, however, that in respectin g Cuba1s national
rights we also have a right to expe ct fro n-. a people for whom we have
had only the friendliest s e ntir:.',e nts a willingness to minimize the adverse repercussions of change on our citizens and to provide equitable
treatment for them and their interests.

We do have a right to object

rr.ost vehen,ently to the subjectm of the good narr. e of this country to
inflarrable charges and slurs by the Cuban government and it spokesmen; charges and slurs which are as unnecessary as they are inaccurate

-10Finally. we do have a ri ght, any American nation has a right,
to bring to the attention of the D,A.S •• threats to the tranquility and
security of this hemisphere and to seek corr.mon action to meet them.
If these premises, Mr. President, constitute a basis for
good neighborly relations, as 1 believe they do, then it follows that
our position in the dispute with Cuba before the a.A,S, should be
built around the following points:

(1)

We should recognize the right of the Cuban people to Tr.ake

such internal changes as they desire and insist only on just, non-discrirr.inatory treatrr.ent for our nationals and con.pensation for dan.age
to their legitimate interests on tern. s which tak e into consideration
Cubats present economic and financial capacities.
(2)

We should recognize Cuba's right, as a sovereign nation,

to trade or otherwise deal with any nation in the world and, equally.
our own right to do the same. as regards sugar or any other
corr.modity.

Equally we shoUld make clear that we are pre p ared

at all times to consider changes in our present econorr.ic policies,
on a mutual basis, which may be of benefit to the Cuban people and
to ourselves.
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(3) We should r eiterate the doctrine of non-intervention in the
nationa l affairs of Cuba or any other A merican nation insofar as any unila teral action on our part is concerned and scrupulously adhere to it, and
see to it that a ll agencies and private citizens adhere to it.

But if the O. A. S.

by due process concludes that the actions of any particular government
outrages the conscience or threatens the tranquility and security of all the
Americas, we should follow whatever course of hemispheric action the
O.A. S. may prescribe by due process .

It is for the Administration alone

which, alone. is in possession of all the (acts and has the constitutional
responsibility to decide when. if at all, to ask the O. A. S . to condemn and
to act against any government on these counts and to make the case in
support of it.
(4) If the need arises, we should seek common hemi spheric action
of whatever kind and degree may be necessary to prevent the establishment
of military bases by nations not of this hemisphere in any American
Republic.
(5) We should welcome conciliatory efforts by the President of the
Council of the O. A.S. in isolating and in finding solutions to the specific
difficulties between Cuba and thi s nation.
Whatever the outcome of the dispute with Cuba, I think we had
bette r face the fact that there will be no victory for one side or the
other.

The fact is that the dispute

has already caused

- 12 serious damage to Cuba. to the United States and to the Western

Hemisphere.

It is to be hoped, therefore. that we will begin this

consideration before the O.A. S. not with a desire to win Pyrric
debates in the kitchen, the parlor or on TV but, rather with a clear
determination to seek a soLution to the problem and with clear ideas

as to what cansitutes an acceptable solution to the problem.
hoped further, that Cuba will do the same.

It is to be

And it is to be hoped,

finally. that the other American states will exert every effort to
bring about a solution that is just and equitable, to the end that this
danger to the hemisphere may be removed.

State of

Inter~American

Relations and Policy

Looking beyond the Cuban dispute. Mr. President. 1 believe

that we will do well to recognize frankly that inter-American relations
are not good and they are not getting any better.

Lest this observation

outrage those whose political antennas in these political times may be
especially sensitive. let me hasten to add that it is made without
political motive.

In retrospect and. in aU honesty, it is clear that the

schisms in inter-American relations began to appear even before this
Administration took office.
Be that as it may. it does not serve the national interests
to offer empty assurances now that all is right with the inter-American
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world or to imply. as this recent announcement of a new aid-program
does. that there is nothing wrong that cannot be cured by a fresh
injection of aid-dollars.
The difficulties go deep.

Insofar as they arise on our part

I believe they stem from a failure to recognize and appreciate the
enormous accumulation of forces for change in Latin America since
World War II and, bence. our failure to reshape our attitudes and our
policies accordingly during the past dozen years.

It is out of this

accumulation that the revolution in Cuba was spawned and it is doubtful
that that revolution is an isolated phenomenon.

The same upheaval may

well re-appear in reasonable facsimile in large segments of the region
to the south unless action is taken in time by the governments directly
involved and by the hemisphere as a whole. to deal resolutely with
the social and economic conditions which are the breeding grounds.
What of our responsibilities to ourselves and to the
hemisphere in the lights of these vast pressures for change? For
anyone who knows the countries to the South and looks to the present
and future rather than to the past. I believe it is apparent that change
is as desirable as it is inevitable.

I do not think acquiescence in

unnecessary misery and vicious repression and exploitation find any
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echo in the finest traditions of this nation.

A determination, else-

where, in the Americas to dispense with such acquiescence is to be
welcomed by this nation.

It follows that our relations with the other

American states must be aligned with progressive change rather than
against it.

Further it follows that the institutions of inter-Americanism

which we did

50

much to bring into being should be used to encourage

this change by evolutionary means in order to avoid, if possible, the
human tragedies which inevitably accompany change by revolution.
1 believe our policies in concept accept these premises.

In a

halting and inadequate fashion. moreover. we have sougbt to build on
these premises.

But what is needed, what has been lacking for years

has been that dedicated and perceptive initiative in inter-American policy
and relations which would breathe new life into the premises and inject
new energy into the institutions of inter-American action.

As the most

powerful and the oldest free nation in this hemisphere, it is our
responsibility to ourselves and to the Americas to provide that initiative.
I say that in all humility, with the belief that our Latin American
neighbors will recognize that it is said without boast but only because it
is the obvious reality and it must be said to awaken us to our responsibilities.

A new birth of initiative, of leadership, is essential if the

irresistible and rapid changes which are already underway in this
hemisphere are to redound to the security and welfare of ourselves and
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the other American peoples.

Unless it is forthcoming, hemispheric

solidarity and the institutions through which it is served may both
be overwhelmed by opportunistic forces within the Americas in
concert with militant intrusions from without.
If we are to reshape the course of inter -American relations

in a fashion equal to the present and future needs of the Americas and
ourselves as a part of them, it seems to me we must begin to act, as

must the Latin Americans, with new insights and a new appreciation
of one another.

We must act with new policies, pursued by a more

effective and dynamic administration of our relations.

I know of no

way to bring about these necessary changes except by an enlightenment
of pubUc understanding of the need and by a responsible leadership.
which is able and willing to consider and to act on new ideas.

New Insights

I should like to set forth. at this time, certain specific thoughts
on how the present and future needs of inter-American relations may be
met, insofar as they can be met by this nation.

I need hardly remind

the Senate that these relations are two-sided and that regardless of what
we do, it will not be enough unless the Latin American nations carry
their share.
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On the need for new insights!
(l)

That the present and the next administration se ek the active

and intense cooperation of the press, motion-picture industry and other
communications-media in a concerted effort to bring up to date the 19th
century comprehension of Latin America widely held in this country and
the 19th century comprehension of this country still largely held in Latin
America.
(Z)

That the present and the next administration seek the active

and intense cooperation of educational institutions in this country to expand
rapidly the studies of Latin America and the languages of its republics.
Conversely. that wise and liberal uee be made of the stagnating local currency accumulations abroad in consultation with Latin American authoritie s, for a similar expansion of the studies of the United

~tates

and the

English language in Latin America.
(3) That serious efforts be made to act on various proposals
previously advanced looking to the establishment of a University of the
Americas in Puerto Rico or some other suitable place, perhaps with
faculties located in various American nations and; again, that wise
and liberal use be made of accumulating local currencies to this end.
(4)

That inter-American exchanges of persons in all the

professions be expanded in numbers and in scope and; again, that wise
and liberal use of accumulating local currencies be made to this end.
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(5) That inter-American tourism be encouraged in every

•

feasible way, particularly through the prompt completion and improvement of the inter-American highway.
(6)

That the President-elect make a get-acquainted visit

to the other Latin American republics prior to his inauguration in
January.

Further, assuming that an inter-American plan of development

and economic cooperation is devised, that the new President, shortly
after his inauguration, invite all the American Presidents to meet in
Washington to initial it ..

New Policies

On the need for new policie 8:
I have already mentioned in detail what I believe to be the
key changes that are required. 1 reiterate them now:
(1)

Full acceptance in our policies of the inevitability and

the desirability of change. change in the direction of an end to unnecessary misery and of repression wherever these conditions may exist in
the Americas.
(2) An end to one-sided haphazard aid in the old pattern in
favor of a carefully conceived, shared-cost. specific. measurable plan
of hemispheric action for development and economic cooperation.
Beyond these key changes. Mr. President, I believe we
need a reappraisal of the policies by which this government has sought
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to stimulate the flow of private capital into Latin America.

We have

got to face the fact that Latin Americans do not necessarily always see
the ingress of foreign capital as an unmixed blessing, and that such
capital is not infrequently one of the primary targets of revolutions in those
nations.

It seems to me that in the years ahead private capital will

perform its greatest service on behalf of its own long-range interests
and the total interests of this nation by integrating its foreign investments
and operations as rapidly as possible into the other American nations.

In

short, U. S . private capital should "nationalize" itself, in the sense of imIf it does 80,

mersing itself in the life of the nations in which it operates.
the constant threat of involuntary nationalization may decline.

The re are

instrumentalities and techniques for achieving this end and some of the most
far-sighted United States companies are already putting them into practice
in Latin America.

They do so by mixing capital with local capital,

by choosing their managers for Latin America on the basis of
their suitability to live as well as to work in other nations, by rapid
transfer of skills through extensive training programs of local inhabitants and by maximum use of local employees on the basis of equality
with its home employees in the management of enterprise.

It seems to

me that even as this government seeks, as it now does, by its actions and
policies which commit us all, to aid U. S. business in Latin America, it
must also act to stimulate the incorporation of progressive practices into
U. S. business in Latin America since their absence affects us all.

-19-

Mr. President, I have already suggeste d that the broad and
vast interests of this nation in

inter~American

relations cannot be

served by uni·!ateral lr.ilitary intervention in the inte rnal affairs of

any American nation.

Yet I do not believe that the doctrine of non-

intervention, as it now stands, is adequate to the present and the future
needs of the An lericas.

There are acts which can be corr.rr.itted by a

governrr,ent which grossly outrage the conscience of the Americas .
There are policies which can be pursued by one nation in this

hemi8~

p here which gravely jeopardize the security of all the American nations.
When these acts occur, when these policies ar e p ursued, the doctrine
of non-intervention in my opinion is not adequate to

th~

need.

The

American nations have already moved and should continue to move in
the direction of new concept of herr.ispheric political cooperation.

CaU it the Doctrine of Hemispheric Concern if you will. V!hat is implicit in it, however, is the need of the American nations to act in
corr.mon against any rr:ember government which grossly outrages the
conscience of the herr.isphere by its behavior or actions or which
clearly endangers the security of the herr.isphere by its Folicies. To
take this step, N. r. Fresident, to modify the doctrine of non-inter vention is a most serious matter but these are n.ost serious times.

I. for one. am persuaded that the nations of this hemisphere are pre-

•

p ared to take it in their common interest and I am persuaded that,
with the
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proper safeguards in the G.A . S. system. a Doctrine of Hemispheric
Concern will be invoked neither lightly nor inequitably.

New Administrative Methods
Finally.

~lr.

President. I should like to turn to the needs of

administration within our own government. in terms of
relations.

inter~American

Regardless of the adequacy of our concepts with respect to these

relations, regardless of our willingness to revamp our policies, we are not
likely to do what needs to be done, given the present administrative structure
for the conduct of these relations.

Apart from a serious lack of outstanding

citizens, dedicated and skilled in inter-American affairs, we are seeking
to act through a creaky. confused and jumbled machinery of administration.
In Latin American affairs, as in others, the State Department, under the
President, has theoretical responsibility; it is there to blame if things go
wrong.

But in inter-American affairs, as in others, policies are deter-

mined or influenced not only by the President and the Secretary of State, but
by various other sources of power in the Executive Branch, from the
National Security Council on down, without adequate central control and
direction.
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The first need in the administration of inter-American affairs
is to make certain that policies originate and flow from the President
through the Secretary of State and that these policies are carried out by all
agencies

concerneduod~l'

State Department and Ambassadorial control.

To

that end. aLL bilateral aid activities, all informational and exchange activities
with respect to Latin America should be made subject to full and decisive

controL of the Secretary of State.

Further, the United States representa-

tives on the International Bank. the Inter-American Development Bank,
and the various U. N. agencies, and aLL other agencies with a greater or
lesser degree of influence on the course of inter-American relations sho uld
be fully responsive to the effective guidance of the Secretary of State.
Second, to reinforce this line of authority, it seems

to

me most

desirable that any new funds appropriated by the Congress for economic
and related purposes in Latin America should be appropriat e d to and
through the Department of State.
Third. it should be our policy and part of our essential initiative
to make every effort to stengthen the O. A. S. and its subordinate agencies,
by stimulating common American action through that organization and by
encouraging personnel policies which wiLL equip that organization for new
and heavier responsibilities.
Mr. President. it is true that any President should have a large
measure of discretion in the administrative structure through which he

- 2Z seeks to conduct the foreign relations of the nation.

But Congress which

provides for this establishment and influences the nature of it by legislation
cannot remain indifferent when that structure gets out of hand. when it
tends by its very nature to dissipate and waste the resources of the people

by duplication, inadequate coordination and a confusion of responsibility.
It is a truism that men are more important than machinery in
effective foreign relations .

It may be that the suggestions which 1 have

made which look to the concentration of authority as weLL as responsibility
in inter-American affairs in the Department of State will not act to increase
effectiveness.

But, if they do not, at least. we shall know where to begin

to Look for the difficulty and where to make the adjustments.

As it is now,

the administrative structure defies an honest fixing of responsibility no
matter how much the Secretary of State may be held responsible and no
matter how often. and often unjustly he may be berated for the failures.
It wouLd be my hope that the ,next President will act promptly
on this problem.

I, for one, as Chairman of the relevent Subcommittee

of the Foreign Relations Committee intend to bring this probLem to the
attention of the Committee and I would welcome an opportunity to cooperate
with the Administration on any necessary Legislation to deal with it.

Concluding Comments
I do not desire to detain the Senate any longer.

It is my intention

to take up other aspects of the international situation and our policies before
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the session closes.

My purpose in these remarks today was to bring to

the fore the question of

inter~American

the Cuban dispute and aid-programs.

relations as it is interwoven with

These questions cannot be sidetracked

by either silence or slogans until next January.
us in the immediate days ahead.

They will be very much with

We need to face them now.

We need to

turn the light of discussion on them now, to the end that we may lay the
basis for the kind of action which must come with the next Administration,
the kind of action appropriate to these times. the kind of action which will
inspire the American Republics to.:l. rededication to the common security
and progress of this hemisphere.

FOR RELEASE FRIDAY A.M.
July 22, 1960

STATEMEllT OF SEllATOR MIKE MAllSFlEID (D., 1«l1mJiA)

liATIONAL SEC1.UUTY AllD IN'lERllATIOllAL PEACE

Matters involving the nation IS secur1 ty and international peace cannot
be put oft.

Every day of dr1ft 1n this realm multiplies our difficulties.

Every day of delay 1n facing the issues increases the cost and intensifies the
dangers to ourselves and to all the world's inhab1tants.
It behooves us to waste

00

time.

We need to resume the sober publ1c

consideration of the interrelated issues of foreign policy and secur1ty which
was set in motion in earnest by the U-2 incident.

If there were any lingering

doubts at the beginning of May as to the need for this consideration they should
certainly have been dispelled by what has transpired since that time.
The feeble cement of stab1lity in the world 1s fast crumbling.

In

scarcely three oooths, we have witnessed the collapse of the President I 8 planned
trips to Russia and to Japan.

There has been further deterioration in Cuban-

American relations; and, with that development, strains and challenges to the
inter-American system have begun to appear.
a grave crisis in the heart of Africa.
negotiation

00.

We have seen the development of

We have witnessed a retreat from

disarmament, nuclear testing and other questions.

In the Far

East a deadly assault on the tormer premier ot Japan bas followed on the heels
of an attack on a leadi1l8 member ot the opposition party and the specter of
government by assassination raises its head again in that key Far Eastern nation.
In Soviet-American relations, the resumption of overt hostility which dates from
the \/-2 incident is higlll.igllted by the RB-47 incident Just a tew days ago.

emons: our allies, the United Kingdom has tightened up on the use of its air

And

r
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bases by our forces I a development presaged by similar norwegian action after

the U-2 incident.
Nor 1s the end in sight.

the world.

We are in a drift away from peace throughout

We are in a drift away from a state of reasonable international

security for our own people and for the reat of the world.
that this trend 1s yet irreversible.

I do not believe

But unless it is checked in the near future

it may become so.

That is why we cannot afford an interregnum until the next President

1s installed in January.

We cannot permit these matters of national security

and peace to drift while we lose oursel ves in a pol! tical campaign as usual.

It is incumbent upon those who have public responsibilities in connection with
these problems to stay with them.

That applies to the

prese~t

It applies to the Congress when it reconvenes next month.

Administration.

It applies to the

permanent civil servants in the Executive Branch who will be pursuing their
duties under the next administration regardless of its political complexion.
It applies to the candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency aod I am
delighted that arrangements have been made by the President to keep them informed.

It would. be more helpful, I believe, if these arrangements went beyond

mere briefings of the candidates by the C.I.A.

The need is for the candidates

to touch base from time to time with the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense and the President in order to exchange views on where we stand on
foreign policy and national security and where we ought to be heading.

If

conferences of this kind can be arranged, the President can re st assured that
Senator Kennedy will be speaking with full authority for the Democratic Party.
Contact between the candidates and the incumbents at this time might help to
insure a smooth transition in policy from this administration to the next.
might also serve to minimize partisanship during the heat of the election
campaign.

It
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I
For my part, I intend to continue to pursue specifics of this issue of
security and peace.

I shall do so by statements in the Senate.

by the introduction of resolutions, as appropriate.

I shall do so

And, as a Member of the

Foreign Relations Committee, I shall, as necessary, seek through hearings and
in other ways to remind the Executive Branch of certain recommendations on
foreign policy and administration which have been made throuah the years.

In

this connection, I note the recommendations on the foreign aid program in Viet
Nam which were advanced by a subcommittee under my Chairmanship last February.
I note also other recommendations in connection with German and European problems advanced last year and still others set forth in a speech in the Senate
on June 23.
In my approach to these problems of national security and peace, I
proceed from this premise:

I do not believe, in all reason, that we can expect

absolute guarantees of national. securl ty and of peace from this or any other
administration.

There can be no such guarantees in a world already fused in

places for massive destruction.

There are no absolute guarantees against

madness, miscalculation or accident.

Against these uncertainties nO system of

ma.ny

military defense can operate to guarantee absolute security to this country,
to the Soviet Union or to any other nation.
most that can

be

Against these uncertainties the

offered by adequate mill tary power and, I stress the word

adequate, is the empty comfort of a capacity tor retaliatory massive destruction.

Without military adequacy we

do

not have even that comfort.

It is within our capacity to make ourselves stronger 1n a military
sense.

It is within our capacity to close the missile gaps, the intelligence

gaps, the research gaps or wbatever.

In short, if we will, we can tip the

balance of military assets in our favor and, in so dOing, discourage a deliberate

a~ession.

But let us get it straight ooce and for all--this approach,

- 3 The problems of national security and international peace are legitimate subjects for discussion in the campaign.

But I hope members of my own

party, no less than the opposition, w111 avoid any attempt to paint these
problems with a broad political brush.

We are all in this together.

problems do not end when one administration replaces another.

These

The flow of

national life 1s continuous and the heritage of wise decisions and foolish
decisions passes from one administration to the next, regardless of party.

Our problems did not begin with the missile gap, the Cuban revolution, the
U-2 inCident, the riots 1n Japan over the President's visit.
begin with the Korean Conflict or Yalta.

Nor did t hey

Equally our successes did not begin

with the armistice in Korea anymore than they began with the

~c

Doctrine,

the Marshall Plan or even the victory in World War II.
Our problems began with the beginnings of the

so, too, did our achievements.

Both. have accwm.:J.at<,d,

P ~.'::":" , 1;.n

republic and

int('!!"l· ';.L 3.~~ cd,

in t he

stream of our hiStory and the inComing administration becomes the heir and
custodian of botb.
We have reached a moment in time

whe~J

8S

a nation, we

ce ~not

afford

that form of political iod,u; gen·.!e vhich '.ilnuld trace tbe origins of all our
present difficulties to one party and
the other.

th~

origios of our present adequacies to

We have reached a moment w€n we need to say what is past 1s past

and get on with the business of today and tomorrow.
New forms, new directions are clearly and urgently needed 10 the vital
matters of security and peace.

ThOBe needs will exist whether the next ad-

ministration is Republican or Democratic and whatever the political complexion
of the next Congress.

For that reason, if for no other, it is incumbent upon

us to proceed now to examine the needs and to begin now to act to meet them.

- 5 whatever its necessity or merit, does not protect this nation and cannot protect
any nation against destruction by irrationality, accident, or miscalculation.
We have spent almost half a trillion dollars on this concept of deterrence.
Other nations, too, have spent heavily in the same fashion.

Yet, I daresay,

the degree of insecurity among peoples everywhere and, particularly among t h ose

who have spent most heavily 1s

DOW

higher than ever before.

That is the reality with which we live.

That is the reality against

which bold words are blunted.

So I repeat, let us not expect of this administration or any other
absolute guarantees of national security.
What the people of

th~

There are none .

United States have a right to demand of this

admioistration or any other, of this Congress or any other, is the courage to
face this reality.

They have a right to demand that measure of wisdom and

energy in political leadership which alone may lead us around this deadly impasse, if indeed, it can be circumvented at all.
What is involved, first and foremost, I believe, i s a revision of
the present incomplete but Widely accepted concept of natiooal security, the
concept that the state of this nation's or any oation's security is measurable
almost wholly in terms of military manpower and materiel and the capacity to
deploy and use them.

This concept, valid to some degree in time of war, is

not enough for the present era.
We must recognize that there is another side to this coin of national
security . We must recognize that military power i6 no longer, for any nation,
the first line of defense of its security.
of bare survival.

It is, rather , the last ditch stand

The only victory, the only security it can guarantee is that

others shall suffer at least as much wholesale devastation and death, as ourselves, if military power is finally invoked as the arbitrator of the world's
difficulties.

- 6 That concept of national security which 1s dominated almost exclusively
by military equations is plausible and persuasive but it 1s seriously shallow
aud incomplete.

Because it is, it has failed to serve the needs of the nation.

If a rational security for the nation can be found at all, it is not going to
be found 1n the military equations through Vhlch it bas been largely sought during the past decade and a half with steadily diminishing returns.

The key, if

there 1s one, 1s likely to lie in perceptive foreign policies and their effective
administration.

That key 1s even DOW a neglected essential in maintaining the

kind of relationships between ourselves and other nations which make it possible
for military power to act even as a deterrent.

And that key, alone, holds

prot!lise of defusing the vorld situation before it is ignited by irrationality,
accident or miscalculation .
The effective use of foreign policies to increase the national security
depends on an acute honesty in observing and interpreting the ever-changing
patterns of the world situation.

It depends on a wise , couxpgeous and prudent

leadership which will act with dispatch, within the capacities of the nation,
on what is observed.

It depends finally on a sensitive, integrated and respon-

sible administration of our relations vith others.

The task reqUires skill aod

dedication ; for our foreign relations are conducted in a world of complex hopes-reasonable and unreasonable, a world of complex fears--rational and irrational-a world of both dark design and human decency, a world of steady nerves and
frayed nerves.
To bring about the effective use of foreign policies for national
security, the first need is to recognize once more and reassert here at home
that foreign policies and their administration constitute the first line of
defense of our national security and the primary channel through which we

- 7 project the doctrines of human freedom as we grasp them and live them.

Until

that is understood and acted upon, we may anticipate a continued erosion of
that international environment most conducive to our safety and to the growth
of freedom.

That will be the case whether we add 2, 10 or 20 billions to the

budget for defense.

The overriding significance of effective foreign policy

to national security and to freedom and to peace, I am confident, will come to
be recognized through a widespread discussion and debate which 1s reasonably
free of cant and campaign capers.

As the national recognition grows, a respon-

sible President and Administration supported by a re sponsible Congress will

proceed to the essential revisions in policies snd administration which will
restore this nation to a position of security in a world more secure.

We shall

make this Dation again, not in mere words but, in fact, the repository of the
hope and trust of mankind.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKEMAllSFIElJl(D •• MOllTAllA)

HOLD FO~ Po"' rASE
'!Jill AUG

j.
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I'M

CONVENTIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

What I am about to say 1s not to be interpreted &s reflecting in sny

way on the candidates of either major parties for the offices of President and

Vice-President of the United States.

For these men, I have only the highest

respect.
My remarks are addressed to the system vhich we have employed to

nominate candidates for the highest offices 1n the land.
Senate knows, has a hiStory of about a century and a half .

This system, 86 the
Participation as

a delegate--or rather a half delegate--ln the democratic convention at Los
Angeles left me with the conviction that the system is seriously inadequate.
The proceedings of the other party 1n Chicago, a8 telecast, served only to
strengthen the conviction despite the promise of the Chairman of the Republican
National Committee to stage a better show than the Los Angeles extravaganza.
I must say that the Tjv networks did an outstanding job.

They went

to great lengths and put themselves to enormous exertion to produce good shows.
Tbey combed and recombed the delegates and the candidates in an effort to
extract every conceivable bit of comedy, pathos, suspense, conflict, melodrama,
yes, and even tragedy.

Then under the direction of a new class of artists--

we might describe them as Convention Tjv impressarios--they ~ve these elements
into veritable spectaculars for the edification and entertainment of the public.
I suspect that the very excellence of the T/V coverage has led
millions of Americans to question the entire nominating and electing procedure
as it now operates.

There are, first of all, the obvious questions.

questions as, who selects the delegates?

Such

Why are some delegates worth only a

r
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hall-vote and others a whole vote?

lihy

do some states split their votes and

some cast them as e unit?

When 1s a primary oct a primary, 1n the sense of

not binding its delegates?

Who waves the men and vomen who wave the signs?

Wby are sons, if they are favorites, abandoned almost as sooo as they are
born?

Wbat have hoopla and hats pyramided 00 the beads of more extroverted

delegates to do with sober deliberation on the merits of candidates?

Those are some of tbe obvious questioos.

There are others, less

obviOUS, but 00 less important.

ifhat do

conventioos of this kind cost and

where does the money come from?

Even more, how 1s it that nominees come into

the arena of deliberations with the bulk of the vote-totals cemented beyond
the reach of deliberation and what goes into this cement?

Aod, finally, Mr.

PreSident, what measure of influence do the people of t he United States from
whom all political authority presumably flows, exert on the selection of
candidates?
I do not think it will take very many more T/V saturation-coverages
to bring home to the citizens of the United States that the present system

of selecting candidates for the highest offices of the land is grossly inadequate to the needs of responsible self-government in the 20th Century.
The truth of the matter is, I believe, that the convention-nominating
system, in its present form) is an anachronism in American political life.

It

came into being at another time and in otber circumstances to which it was
undoubtedly better attuned .

It bas persisted) in large part) because of

popular indifference and because) seemingly, it is easier to go along with
things as they are rather than to make modifications or replacements 1n wellestablished institutions unless compelled by immense public pressure to do so.

L
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I may be overly optimistic, but I would anticipate that 10 the caee
of the present nominating-system, the stark revelations of the T/V screens may
induce the necessary popular pressure.

It seems to me, at the very least , that

popular revulsion at the sign-waving shenanigans and the assorted hoopla will
compel the elimination of these contrivances as well as the "man wbo" seconding
speeches, and, perhaps, even favorite soos.

Changes such 88 these, however ,

would be largely in the nature of face-lifting.

They might improve the "image"

of the convention-system but they vill not go to the heart of the problem.
The problem, as I see it, is two-fold.

First, it 1s to try to equalize the

i nfluence of every voter , who desires to participate, in the selection of
candidates for the party of his choice.

Second, it is to increase the opportunity

for all potential and serious candidates for the ?residency and Vice Presidency
to be equally considered.

In connection with the first problem, the corrective device which is
usually Buggested is the national primary.
volved in the use of this device.

There are many difficulties in-

How, for example , do we keep the number of

nOminees for the nomination in each party within rational limits?
nominate by plurality or maJority1

Do we

How are democrats separated from republicans

and minor parties and what of cross-over voting1
that none of these difficulties is insurmountable.

Personally, I am persuaded
There is a vast wealth of

experience on which to draw in the states employing primaries and in the
electoral devices of foreign countries.

I believe a fair and equitable and

practicable national primary can be established if we are of a mind to do so.
Short of a national primary there are many improvements which could
be made in the existing convention system, looking to the extension and
equalization of popular control over the selection of candidates.

It is
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conceivable, for example, that the selection of state-delegations could be
lim.! ted to two methods .

One method. might be tbe state primary conducted on

the basis of uniform rules for all states and with the delegates so chosen,
subject to the same rules regarding pledges and releases from pledges for

particular candidates.

A second method might be the state party convention

but subject to uniform rules of conduct Bod pledge as among the several states.

I believe it is reasonably clear in the legal precedents that Congress
haa the constitutional right to legialate on the conditions of Presidential

elections.

It would seem that Congress has a similar right in regard to Presi-

dential nominating systems from which the elections are inseparable.

In any

event, the possibility of bringing about desirable changes by Constitutional
amendment is alvsys open.
In regard to the second aspect of the prOblem, the need to increase
the opportunity for all potential candidates to be equally considered, the
basic question, to put it bluntly) is money.

Even if we assume that the

nomination for the presidency is a race to be run or a prize to be woo) theo
a sense of fair play would indicate the desirability of neutralizing the factor
of financing by personal wealth, wealthy backers and pressure-groups.

But if

we view the Presidency and Vice Presidency, as I believe they ought to be
viewed, 8S offices which should seek for their incumbents among the ablest,
the most dedicated citizens and permit them to be free of personal obligation

to any particular groups or individuals within our SOCiety, then all the more
it seems essential to neutralize the financial factor.
In this connection, it would be helpful if active Presidential
nominating campaigns could be limited in time to a period. of a month or less.
Further, the expenses of bonafide nominees should be borne out of public funds

1
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and all personal expenditures by the Dominees or on their behalf by otaer individuals or by groups should be rigidly curtailed .

That this approech to

financing campaigns 16 not only theoretically but actually possible 1s borue
out by the experience of others.

The United K1nedom, for example, effectively

limits election expenditures and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides for
the reasonable expenses of bonafide political parties out of the public
t r easury.
Nor can the cost of financing campaigns out of public funds be regarded
as a burden on the public .

The public, in the long run, may well pay many times

over for the privilege of being relieved of the campaign expenditures which are
now borne largely by a small group of beavy contributors aod. purchasers of

$100 .00 a plate dinners.

There could be no greater safeguard of the public in-

terest and the public purse than to place public officials under full financial
obligation to and in the full financial control of all the people of the United
States rather than a few.

\Vhat applies 1n connection with the financing of

nOminating campaigns for the PreSidency would apply of course with even greater
releVance to actual election-campaigns and, in all candor, to the election of
Members of Congress.
The need is to examine this two-sided problem while the experience
of the conventions and the coming election-campaign remains fresh in our minds.
I would hope, therefore, that the next President would encourage and the next
Congress would act through its appropriate Committees to give thorough consideration to ways 1n which we can equali ze the voice of all Americans in the
selection of candidates and to equalize the opportunity for all candidates to
be considered.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIEID (D., MONTAlIA)

THE COlIGO AND POLICY TOWARDS THE NEH AFRICA

Mr. President:

Hopes rise and fall with respect to developments in the Congo . A
road to an orderly and progressive future for that regton opens one day only
to be blocked the next by seemingly insurmountable obstacles . The probl ems
of the Congolese transition are dumped suddenly on the United Nations to tbe
tune of universal. acclamation.

Just as suddenly discordant notes are injected

into the tune.
It 1s late in the day of this Congress to raise a question of this
kind.

I do eo, however, because almost imperceptibly but deeply and rapiruy,

this government 1s moving into involvement in the affairs of the Congo and
Africa.

Acts of the Senate are a factor 1n this trend 1'0 policy and, hence,

the Senate shares reapoDs1b111 ty for the form which the trend assumes.

I

would note in this connection that we have recently approved an increase in
the President's contingency fund of $100 million and that thie amount was
sought by him in anticipation of needs in the Coogo and elsewhere in Africa.
S~nce

we do have a responsibility it behooves us to see as clearly as we are

able the essentials of the situation which exists on the African continent
and to consider the course which we are pursuing.
Let me say at the outset that the conduct of African policy for the
past few years by the PreSident, the Secretary of State and Mr. Lodge at the
United Nations, in my opinion, deserves the support of the Senate .

They have

acted with insigbt and dispatch in dealing with a most uncertain situation.
It is no criticism of them to Dote that, of late, the waters of
African affairs and, partiCularly, those in the Congo have become more turbulent.
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'Vlhat 1s te.k.ing p1ace in the Congo may spread

continent.

to other parts of the African

Indeed, in the last few days the short- lived unity of Senegal and

the Soudan Republic in the Mali Federation has threatened to come apart in
factional dispute .
In short, we are likely to be in for a protracted period of diffi culties in Africa.

It 1s not easy to define the sources of these difficulties

even though it 1s essential for the Senate to make the effort.
the pOint of view of our comprehension is a new continent.

Africa from

It has burst upon

our awareness suddenly, after having been shut off almost entirely by barriers
of nature and the closed doors of colonial enclaves .

:'lbat we need to know now

for effective policies 1s not to be derived hom the old travel books on Africa

and the attitudes Which they induced .

It 1s the emergent Africa, the Africa

of today and, even more important the Africa of tomorrow which
fathom.

~e

must seek to

For it is to this new Africa that we must address our policies .
It will be sometime before the channels of objective information and

skilled. interpretation become ful.l.y adequate to this need.

Hhat pours out of

Africa today is a confusing mixture of fact and fancy, of the sober and the
sensational, of what is past and what is yet to be.

However, there is a con-

stant improvement in the flow of information as American reporters, writers
and scholars converge on the African continent and a network of American
embassies develops in the new republics .

Colonialism
Some of the significant realities have already come into sharper
focus.

The first and most important of these is that European colonialism

as a system of government is fast disappearing.

At the end of Uorld :"/ar II,
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there were 4 independent nations in Africa.

Now, there are 24.

the year, 2 more former colonies will become independent.
including South Africa, e1gned the U.N. Charter in 1945.

By the end of

Four African nations,
Ten African states

are nov members i 14 are likely to become members in the very near future.
It 1s clear that colonialism 18 rapidly disappearing 88 a political

system in Africa.

What 1s not

80

clear but what

~

be of even greater signi-

ficance 1s that colonialism. as a pol!tical propellant has not yet left the

scene.

The word still has the capac1ty to evoke a militant nationalism, and

even racism, in Africans.
begins to decrease.

Its capacity in this respect may increase before it

That is likely to be the case so long as any part of the

African continent remains under alien jurisdiction.

It 1s liltely to be the case

so lons as any independent nat10n of Africa, now dominated by European settlers,
has still to evolve a workable system of government under which the peoples of
varying races can 11ve together in a reasonable acceptance of one another.

It

is likely to be the case until a tree Africa persuades itself that it is a tul.l
and equal participant in the general affaors of the world.

The persistence ot this political propellant may or may not be Valid
in logic.

What matters from the point of view of policy, however, 1s that it

exists in tact and it is likely to continue to exist tor some time.

A policy

which, in concept or admin1strat1on, ignores its ex1atence rests upon a most
frag11e foundation.

Po11tical Instab1lity
Beyond the perSistence ot the factor of colonialism, there are other
po11t1cal realities in the African situation with
reckon.

wh1ch our policies must

It ie now apparent that the stability of the colonial system was

imposed from without at the price of a l.&rge measure of social ELtrophy within
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Africa.

The basic mode of existence for great numbers of Africans today differs

little from the pattern of aD earlier time with its multiple tribes, multiple
languages, multiple customs, values and superstitions.

Furthermore, the poli-

tical boundaries which colonialism drew in Africa were more a consequence of

power-adjustments among the European nations rather than expressions of natural.
divisions and of human forces vithin Africa. Itsel.f.

Yet it is within these

boundaries that African nations, today, ere emerging into independence.
I do not make these observations in criticism.
and cannot be undone.

\o/hst is past 1s past

I point to these factors because they are significant

in t be unstable 81 tuatlon with which our policies must deaJ. during this period
of transition in Africa.

There will be strong pressures to pull. apart the

outwardly-imposed political unities and to revert to the schismatic earlier
pattern.

The sophisticated nationalism of a hand..f\l.l of African leaders will

not easily be transferred to the many.

These leaders tbemselves will have to

search for ways to reorder bouniaries into new political units, knowing as
they do the requirements for a durable statehood in the modern world.
considerable extent this search can be fruitful and beneficial.

To a

Other con-

sequences, however, may also be antiCipated if the search becomes aggressive
or if African leaders pursue concepts of pan-Africanism on the basis of a
militant racism.

African Leadership and Modern Skills
That brings me, Mr. PreSident, to still another significant factor
in the African situation with which we must deal in policy.

To a degree per-

haps unparalleled since the revolutions of independence in the Americas, the
great political transition in Africa depends upon a handful of trained and
experienced leaders.

And unlike the simple world of the Americas at en earlier

- 5 time, Africa is being propelled, in independence, into the modern world of
instant communications, missiles, nuclear power and complex bureaucratic
organization.

Few Africans bave been introduced a8 apprentices and, even fewer as
tnaIl8.gerleJ. participants in the affairs of the modern state, the modern economy,
and the modern world.

Yet many must learn rap!dJ.y lf, to the bare bones of

independence, tbere 1s to be added the sinews of economic and political
organization which w111 give that independence beneficial meaning and durability
for the people of Af'rica.

The prob1em 1s not simply one of replacing the

European colonial bureaucracies, with U.N. or other bureaucracies and, then,
with an African bureaucracy

in the same form.

However much replacements of

this kind may be unavoidable for the present, the deeper problem 1s the development of responsible African government and responsible African management
to guide the African peoples into a \lay of life sui ted to their needs and, at
the same tbne, capable of peaceful, free and constructive cooperation in the
general progress of maokind..
The task which confronts an emerging Africa is monumental.

Much

will depend on an understanding and patient band from the rest of the world.
But even more will depend upon the dedication, the wisdom and the realistic
restraint of those few Africans who are now assuming the reins of political
power.

Tbey, more than anyone else, w111 make the decisions which set the

patterns, for better or for worse, for the new way of life in Africa.

Outside Influences
I turn now, Mr. President, to the last significant factor in the
African 61 tuatlon with which I wish to deal at this time.

I have already

noted that Afr1ca's future is partially dependent on an understanding and
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patient assist from the rest of the wor ld .

There appears to be a great, a

universal eagerness to lend a hand in Africa.
Union and China.

\</e see it clearly 1n Cai ro .

We see it cl early in the Soviet
We see it clearly in Europe .

We see it clearl y 1n this country and in the United Nations.
What we do Dot yet see clearly 1s the nature of this band.

there i s a human and sincere

des1re·~and

Certainly

I am sure it exists among the people

of all countries- - to belp those who for too long have been cut off from equal
participation in the mainstream of human civilization.
is in the extended. hands?

But is that all there

Is there not also a certain eagerness to project

into Africa the many ramifications of the cold war and other power-rivalries
which now plague the rest of the vorld.?
The field 1s 'Wide-open for that game at the moment.

transition and its leadership has only limited experience.

But transitions

are not forever and those Vho have learned the way to national
are equipped to learn other matters.

Africa 1s 1n

independe~ce

Most important, I believe the emerging

African peoples have had enough of the role of pawns moved on the chessboards
of others .

They will not meekly assume that role again and they will react

against tbose wbo seek to return them to it.
It may be too much to expect but it is not too much to attec:tpt to
insulate an emergent Africa from the

inte~national,

storms ....hich now sweep the rest of the world..

political and ideological

In any event, I believe that

pol iCies, in concept or administration, which deliberately seek to project
these storms into Africa will redound neither to the benefit of the African
nations nor even to the long-range interests of those nations whicb pursue
them .
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The Situation 1n the Conso
The factors which I have been discussing and with which our policies
respecting Africa must contend are to be found to a greater or lesser degree
throughout that continent.

And they are of intense significance 1n the

immediate crisis 1n the Congo .

The propellant of colonialism still drives

people 1n that region to militant action despite the fact that independence
has been achieved, despite the fact that the Belgians are 1n rapid withdrawal
BS U.N. forces enter the situation.

Furthermore, as the colonial system baa

been progressively dismantled, the outward political unity which this system
created faces rising Centrifugal pressures, not only 1n Katanga but elsewhere
1n that huge land.

Also in evidence 1n the Congo 1s the counter-groping of

pan-Africanism to which I have already alluded; unfortunately, I may add, it
has already taken on some dangerous racial overtones in the expression of
differing attitudes towards U.N. forces supplied by African nations and those
from elsewhere .

In the Congo, too, is to be found an enormous gap between

the immediate need for skilled Africans in government and management and the
extremely limited supply .

In the Congo, finally, we see the helping hand

from the rest of tbe world extended in sincere understanding of the difficulties confronting this new nation but also with the muscles at the external
power-rivalries flexing here acd there in an eagerness to plunge into the
inviting situation.

United States Interests
If we are to deal effectively in policy not only with the situation
in the Congo but, in truth, with developments throughout Africa, we must not
only see our interests clearly but we must pursue those interests in the
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light of significant factors of the kind I have been discussing today.

interests, Mr. President, are not hard to define.

Our

They arise, first and

foremost from the universal implications of the historic American doctrines
of freedom.

And men and women in Africa, today, are striving for freedom and

its meaning for them.

They may struggle awkwardly aod ineptly, perhaps, and

sometimes even blindly but, nevertheless, the struggle 1s authentic.

Furthermore, Mr. President, American citizens have modest, cultural
and commercial. ties vi th Af"rlca and the prospects for the improvement of the

ties are good as Africa develops in freedom.

These, too, constitute American

interests.
Finally, Mr. President, we have an interest 1n human progress in

peace in Africa.

We have that interest 1n part because we cannot, and no

people worthy of the name human can, close eyes to the desperate travails of
a vast segment of the human family.

We have it, too, because the peacetul

progress ot Africa is interrelated with the peace of the people ot this
nation in this second half ot the 20th Century.

We have this interest because

it Africa can progress in freedom and peace, it will spare us the extension
of the costly trappings of the cold war to still another continent.

Framework tor United States Policy
What, then, do these interests suggest as a proper course of policy
for this nation?

I do not believe that they suggest that we plunge headlong

into the turbulent troubles of Africa with eager do1l8rs, with unsolicited
adVice, with an indiscriminate out-pouring of new military and economic aidprograms wherever takers may be found.

It should be obvious, now, on the
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basis of experience elsewhere that this approach can guarantee neither to
dispel Africa's troubles nor to exorcise communism from that continent.
Equally, Mr. President, we must resist the easy temptation to pass off the
difficulties in Africa as of little import to this nation.

In sbort, our

isPortaot but limited interests suggest that we do not assume the role of
either first or last among equals in our approach to Africa but that we take
our place as true equals among outsiders while Africa develops within, under
its own leadership and in accord with its owo geOius.

This view presupposes

a major effort of assistance by the United Nations, as Africans need it, seek
it and caD use it.

as the glib slogan:

But I hasten to add that that supposition 1s not the same

"Let the United Nations do it."

With all due respect to Mr. Hammarskjold, a brilliant and dedicated
man, the fact is that what needs to be done in Africa will not be done unless
the policies of this gpvernment and others aod, most of all, the leadership
of the new Africa permit it to be done.

Principles of a United States Policy on Africa
We cannot answer for others in this connection but we can look to
our own policies on Africa and their administration.

In the light of the

analysis vb.ich I have attempted today, I would suggest that our policies must
flow from the following principles:
(1)

This nation should give its support, diplomatically and

otherwise to the end that independence and human equality will eventually
be achieved throughout Africa.

Our support

~st

go, as it has beRU:n to go

under this Administration, to those who work soberly in Africa for these ends.
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May I say, in all candor, that this principle grows easier to maintain with
consistency and dynamism as the nations of Europe with whom we are associated
in other matters increasingly espouse it in their own African policies.

The

difficulties, however, are great aod will remain great in those areas in

Africa of heavy European settlement and I do not wish to make light of the
task of those who must conduct our policies affecting those areas.
It seems to me particularly important that this principle find ex-

pression 1n the character aod conduct of our expanding network of embassies
1n the new African republics.

I hope that these establishments w111 be kept

modest 1n size and character.

I hope, further, that our official representa-

tives will seek a fresh aod full understanding of the situations which they
encounter, based upon direct and broad contact with the peoples of these new
nations.

I hope, finally, that these embassies will be conducted in a manner

which reflects the si!ple goodwill of this nation towards the new republics
of Africa and our sympathetiC appreciation of their struggles.

In sum, it

seems to me of the utmost importance that now, at the beginnings of contact
with the new Africa, our official representation be kept free of those
characteristiCS which would invite a deflection of the political propellant
of colon1alism to this nation.
(2)

In the absence of over~rid1og considerations to the con-

trary, this nation should use whatever influence it can against a centrifugal
fragmentation of existing political units in Africa.

However powerful the

divisive forces of an ancient tribalism may still be, they are the forces of
the dying Africa; they are not the strengths of the Africa that is struggling
to come into being.

May I say that to hold to this principle 1s not to stand

against adjustments in present political boundaries.

Such adjustments are to
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be anticipated and are to be encouraged if they lead to more practical
political and economic units.

We should resist these tendencies, however

if they derive either from a narrow tribalism or a sweeping racist pan-

Africanism.
I realize that these particular problems must be dealt with

primarily by the African peoples themselves.

There 1s every indication,

however, that the United Nations may be drawn increasingly into them.

Since

that is the probability, we must be prepared to exert our influence affirma-

tively in that organization and, in other ways, on the side of modern political progress in Africa.
(3)

We should reCOgnize that the hopes for freedom. and

progress in Africa during this period of transition depend, perhaps, more
on the calibre of men than on the forms of governments and we should lend
a most understanding ear to those African leaders who, with sincerity,
personal dedication and realism seek to move their nations forward.
We must learn, quiCkly, as much as we can about the emergent
African leadership and, if we are to learn accurately, we will eschew such
inapplicable frames of reference as pro-communist or pro-western.

The

leadership that matters for the future of Africa will be neither one nor
the other.

It will be pro-African in the finest sense of the term in that

it will be dedicated to the welfare of its own peoples and will drive sObtrly
but relentlessly to increase their CaPaCity for survival and expression in
the modern world.
(4)

We should Join with all nations so inclined in an effort

to lend a genuinely helpful hand to the vast needs of Africa for training in
modern skills and for prompt economic and social development.
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If Africa is to make the moet of this help and, if the rest of the
world is to gatn trom it in terms of peace, then it seems to me that this help
must go to Africa free of any extenslon··expressed or lmplied--of the power
conflicts and rivalries which divide the world.

The che.llenge of Africa is

not a call to greater propaganda battles between us and the Soviet Union.
The challenge of Africa is to the world.

It is a challenge to belp open in

peace the doors of modern life for the peoples of Africa, for their benefit
and for the still unfathomed benefits which may flow to mankind from that
opening.

Specifics of a United States Policy
If we accept this as the deeper Challenge of Africa then it seems

to me that we must begin to seek agreement through out policies, 1n the U.N.
and el.se'Where, on the folloWing points:

(1)

That a.ll requests for military training missions and

military aid from the African nations henceforth be referred to the United
Nations aDd that such missions, as approved by the Security Council, be
supplied solely under the aegis of the U.N.;

furthe~

that eXisting military

aid missions in Africa be converted into U.N. missions at the request of any
independent African nation and, as rapidly as possible.
(2)

That the United States seek agreement with the Soviet

Union to the end that both nations shall refrain from seeking military bases
in Africa and from sending military forces to soy part of Africa except ss
the Security Council may direct; further, that existing bases of either nation
in Africa be closed out in due course snd any military forces of either nation
on the African continent be withdrawn as the Security Council may direct.

" 13 "

(3) That the Un! ted Nations effort in the Congo, and similar
efforts which may be required and BOUght elsewhere in Africa, henceforth be
financed by a four-quarters fund:

one-quarter sUpplied by tbe United States;

one-quarter by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe acting,

8S

willing, in

concert; one-quarter by Western Europe acting, as willing, in concert; and

one-quarter by the other members of the United Nations.
(4)

Tbe:t"the four-quarters :fund be used, further I as the

principal instrument for financing a substantial program of technical aid
to Africa, to be pursued predominantly through an expansion of educational
and training facilities in that continent, with technicians and teachers

sUpplied on a similar four-quarter division, under the general direction of
the U.N. Secretary-General; and further, 8S this effort comes into operation,

that bilateral assistance by all nations in Africa be progressively curtailed.

Mr. President, my principal interest today haa been to explore the
limits of our proper concern in the unfolding situation in Africa.

The

difficulty which confronts our policy is not only that we may do too little
but that we may be impelled to do too much and in ill·adapted ways and, hence,
contribute to the creation on the African continent of still another front in
the cold war.

We shall not be thanked by the Africans if that is the effect

of our contribution regardJ.ess of its size and our good intentions.

Nor will

we serve the interests of this nation by enlarging the already costly trappings
of the cold war--notablyl military and political aid l propasaoda dissemination
and increased defense expenditures--!f it can be avoided.
Mr. President, I do not know if it will be possible to bring into

being the beginnings of a constructive and cooperative approach to Africa
along the lines of the suggestions which I have advanced.

There is little

- 14 ground for sanguine expectations.

Nevertheless, I believe we should make,

in policy, an effort of this kind.

We should make it With all diligence

and 1n all sincerity.

We should make it in our owo interests, in the in-

terests of the emergent African peoples and 1n the interests of the peace of
the world.

At

EXtemporaneous F~marks of Honorable Mike Mansfield of Montana
t~e Annual Membe~ship Dinner of the American Mieing Congress at
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, New York
December 5, 1960

Mr.

Chairman, Members of the American Min1ng Congress, and frier.ds.

I

almost started out by saying "my fellow Democrats" .. then I thought that wouldn't
be right, and I almost said "My fellow Republicans" - and I knew that woul.dn't be
right either ... - so I will say ''My fellow Americans, II and mean it.
You know in a sense, coming to New York to have the privilege and honor of
addressing this meeting is almost like coming bome.

I see people here like Ed

McGlone, Vice President of Anacondaj Ed and I started in December 1922 at the
Colorado Mine in Butte.

I see one of our distinguished delegates to the United

Nations, Art Lamey from Montana, a friend of many years, whose daughter I bad the
privilege to teach at Montana University.

I see Charlie Murray, a friend and

counsellor going back for too many years to remember.

I see the Under Secretary

and some Assistant Secretaries from the Department of the Interior, and I want them
to know that I am. grateful to all of them for the cooperation they have shown in
their capacities in helping to briv8 about the development of Montana and the
Northwest.
I refer, for example, to Under Secretary Bennett and the fine job he d!d
as the Chief of the American Delegation in bringing about an agreeable solution,
we hope, to the problems of the Upper Columbia; and to Assistant Secretary Abbott,

who was so courteous and considerate at the time Bill Zeckendorf, of Webb & Knapp
visited the Department of the Interior to sign a contract with the Bonneville Power,
which may bring about the establishment of a steel plant in the Butte-Anaconda

er~a.

Ray mentioned the fact that I started out as a miner; that wasn1t quite
correct.
$4. 75

"'~.s

I started out as a mucker, and eventually got to be a miner because
a 11 ttle higher than

$4~25

1n those days.

But I have worked as a miner

and a mucker in Butte, 1n the Coeur d'Alenes, and in Bisbee.

Hon. Mike Mansfield

- 2 I learned a lot -- going down into those mines

to study human nature at f1:-st band..

because I had a chance

And much of what I have learned in the mines

has been responsible for my philosophy in the years subsequent to that experience.
I also think. this 1s a good time to publicly acknowledee the fine ..,oxIt be ..

iog done by the representatives of the American

~dnlng

Congres3 in Washington, and

men like JUlian Conover and Harry Moffett and those who are associated with them,
because they have been diligent, they have been on the job, and they have tried to
look after t he interests of the mining industry a8 a wbole.

Now J I recall 1n my mining days J that even then a.s far

concerned, it was either a "feact or a famine."

today

th~t

I am

so~ry

88

most mining """8.S

to state that even

same statement «ill still hold true, and I don't care what segment of

the meine industry it is -- there are too many ups and there are too many dOlrn!S,
and. sometimes, as in the coal industry, the dums are all too often most apparent.
! vould hope that all of us \IOuld develop a greater understanding of

forei gn affdirs and vhat it

~eans

to our country.

Because I think that

thos~ ~f

you who are engaged in mining and allied iooustries will have to -- whether you
want to or not -- become more cognizant of

wh~t

is going on in the world around us,

and rec ognize the fact that regardless of how we may feel personally the world 1s
shrinking aOO is going to shrink a lot more in the yeexs ahead.

When you t..'1i!".k of

a plane like the B-70 which can fly at a speed three times tbat of sound -- 2200
miles an hour -- you begin to get an idea of bow distance has been shc=tened end,
in a sense, time bas

be~n

coctracted.

Now I do not inter.d to talk about the futUre of miniM tonight ~

Every

person in this room knows a great deal more about mining nud its rsm!fications than
I do, but I would -- with your permission -- like to speak about foreign policy and
wbat it may hold for all of us, no matter what industry we are 1n, no matter what
avocation or profession we follow.

The campaign 1s over, so we can say things now

and not be accused of "pla'y ing politics", and what I would like to do 1s to call

Hon. Mike Mansfield
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a:~tention

some of the difficulties which confront aU of us, rel3ardless of

party, in the dangerous decade ahead.
The world is not in goed shape.

to eet worse before they get better.

And in my opinioD, conditions" ore. ~ojng

We are all aware of the fact that lately a

mission headed by Secretary Anderson of the Tre&sury and lnclw!1ng Under Secretary

of state Douglas Dillon, both very capable men, has been in Europe for the purpose
of doing something about the outflow of gold from this country to various countries
overseas.

We know that we have in Fort Knox something on

worth of gold.

t~e

order of $28 billion

We know 81e::o that practically all that gold at the present ti1lle is

callable tf the demand is made.

We know, furthermore, that within the past week or

60 the reserve has gone below $18 billion and the prospects are that it
lower still.

~nll

Now that doesn't mean that there is any possibil1ty in t.he

fUture of a devaluation of the American dollar, but it does mean that the

go

immed~.C1te
P~er~c~n

dollar today is not as streng as i t was a year, two yea;.'s, or three years ago o
This gold eutflow didn't happen just within the past month.
least three years ego and maybe 10nger

D

We

k~ew

about th1s at

'lhis gold outflow 1s not made possible

because there is an imbalance in cur trade.

It 1s made

poss1bl~ bec~use

of the

fact that 1n spite of a favorable balance of trade, we are spending a good deal on
foreign aid and overseas military expenditures which makes up the difference and
thereby brings about a situation which must and will be met if at all

posB1~le

by

t·he present Administration in the few months it has remaining, and if not '::>y them __
then I think by the incoming Administration.
New I do not thin.'\. that Secretary Anderson and Secretary Dillon are to be
castigated for what they did in

E~ope;

I think they made a neces3ary effort to

try to bring home to the European nations, all of which had been helped by us, the
Bituatio~

as it really is, and while they came back empty-handed, so to speak, I

think they made an impression; an impression to an extent that in the field of
foreign aid in the future we will see more and more in the way of multileteral
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assistance and lesD and less - - I hope, 8S far as our own country is concerned
in the field of unilateral assistance.
Our country has spent in excess of $70 billion since the end of the

~e~ond

World War to help other countries rehabilitate themselves and to extend aid to the
lmdzrdevcloped. areas of the world.
cou~trles,

It 16 about time, 1n my opln!oD, for those

which we have helped, to come to our

~slstance

-- and to help us help

those countries achieving nationhood so that their people can take their place 1n
the fam1!y of nations.

1 hope, sincerely, that such

Manthe; a:.ld the years ahead ..

~.ll

be the effect in the

I would hope J furthermore J that as far as our country

1s concerned we would be able to do something in the way of a multilateral program

through

~he

United Nations, with this proviso

that these members of the United

Nations, who vote so easily and so eagerly for new programs calling for
tens of millions and hundreds of millions of dollars,
their

p~oport1onate

w~ll

million~,

themselves -- assume

sbare.

r speak from experience when I state that many of these countries are interested in such programs as "Sunfed", which calls for a $500 million appropr:!.ation
to extend assistance to countries

t~oughout

the world which are in need.

But I

recall, being a delegate to the U. N. two years ago, representing this country,
coming to the General Assembly with a check for something on the order of

~+O

million which would compri3e the Un! ted States I share of a fund of $100 miill.on
vbich had been voted almost unanimously by the tull membersh1p of the U. No
The $40 million was supposed to represent a certain percentage of the whole,
and if the other countries did not came through with their prowrated share, our
$40 million would be reduced accordingly .
of the

~~ted

Nations, the grand

to~al

At the end of the 13th

Gene~al Asse~bly

authorized and put up by all the countries

was something on the order of $55 million, and of that $55 million ours had been
reduced. from $40 to about $22 million.

Hon. Mike Mansfield
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That I s what I meao ·..rhen I say that many other countries ex?ec"!; us to pick

up too much of the burden, financially speaking, when they vote for these appro-

priat!ons o

And I would hope thet from now on we would be core careful in hm{

lIe

handle our funds; that we would operate -- and I repeat .- on a multilateral tas1s,
and in thst way bring about a sbarlll§. of the respons1b1li ty ..
There 1s a lind t to what this country can do, and I think

people have reached the stage
are aware of this

fa~t a~~

w~ere

-- despite all

thei~

that t.he American

good heartednesa -- they

they expect something to be done on a multilateral

basts from now on.

During the course of the campaign, there
prestige of this country,"

~~s

a good deal of talk about the

What do we mean by "prestige II ?

Well, we mean the stand-

ing of a nation in the eyes of the other countries of the 'W'orld.
prestig ~

has declined.

I t hink our prestige has declined.

Fra~~ly,

we bad better face this fact and do something &bout it.

there is a saying on the building which houses the
of America which says: lIWbat is past is prologue. 1I
can't look back.

Supposedly, our

As

Arc~ives

A.~d

I

thia~

Mr. CaDaver said)
of the United Sta t es

The past is prologue .. so ....e

It doesn't do us any good to find fault.

We have to live in the

present and we have to prepare for the future.
In30far as this question of prestige is concerned, I think it woul d

~e

hoove us to take a brief look at the map of the world and see just what the s ituation is in certain areas and perhaps in certain countries .
Let's go first to Western

Eu;~·ope.

We fi nd there that some countries 8.!'e --

financially speaking -- in better condition than the United States is at the
present time.

We find there what is supposed to be a defeneive shield: NATO

the North Atlantic Treaty

Organi~~ion)

which was created for the purpose of hold-

ing back any Russian aggression which might occur during the period primarily when
Weste!'D Europe was recover1.ng and was being rehabilitated.
As a matter of fact, NATO bas gone down over the past ten years, under the
last two years of the

Demo~ratic

Administration, and I think under the eight years

-
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was one
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It 1s more of a symbol.

It 1s no longer a shield

~-

it it ever

I dare say that today Nt.TO could not put 21

combat-ready divisions 1n the field.

And of those 21 -- if there are 21

-~

five

of them v~uld be American divisions, which are combat-ready 1 and ready to goo
But ...·!l.at about the responsibil1ty of the other 14 mem!>c:"s of NATO"?

are the allocations which they were supposed to make?

Where

I thiOk what we need there

1s a strengthening, not only in a military sense, but I would say elso in an
economic sense aa well.
speak!ng -- thet, of
the

»~opeans

cour8~,

1s a de31red goal; but that is the responsibility of

themselves.

Now let
really.

As far as European unity 1s concerned .- politically

U8

go to the Middle East.

What has been done there?

Because the basic difficulties still remain.

the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis.
g~t

Nothing,

And the basic difficulty is
Of

course we are trying to

by, by appropriating money through our aid programs on a

proportio~te

But - we are

to the kC'sb States on the one hand, and to Israel on the other hand .
~

meeting the bas ic difficulties !n that area, end

~

and

basis

unles s we do there

wiU be no peace 1n the Middle East, flnd i1" there is no peace ill the Mid1.le East
there will be no peace in the world.
These are things we have to face up to.

rug.

We just can't avoid them.

We just can tt sweep them under the

Because if we do so, we do it at our

What about Southeast Asia?

~*D

peril.

There, ot course, we have great programs under

way -- to Viet Nam, to Laos, to the ?h1lipplnes, to Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea, up
in Northeast ASia; and elsewhere -- but what has been the effect of these huge expenditures of aid?

You have seen the answer in the public

prin~s.

You h6ve read

about the Laotian Situation, where, since 1953, we have put in approximately $300
mllllon.
I was in Laos in 1953 when we had just one vice consul looking after the
whole country.

Today we

t~ve

hundreds of Americans and we have spent -- I repeat
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sot.ett:lrJ8 on the order of $300 million dollars.

'!his, 1n a country where the per

cap1ta income does not exceed $25 per perSOn per year.
~~

have we accomplished with this $300 million?

The answer 1s:

l'!otb.:t:u:c.

--~-

Because what you have now are four different groups striving for control there, and
Just about two weeks ago, the Premier of Laos, Souvanna Phouma, eaid that we would
"accept gladly" aid which had been of:fered to him by the Soviet UnioD.
What about Japan?

A countr y 10 thousand square mllea smaller than my state

of Montana, with roughly 94 million people compared to Montana's 670 thousand
people.

What are we going to do about Japan ?

OUr textile people are ra1s1f1-8 the

devil because they have imports coming in from that country.

know

~_

But did you folks

or do you know -- that Japan 1s our biggest customer in tallow, in hides,

in cotton and in wheat? At the present time she ranks second or third as far as a
market for exports from this country a:e concerned.
Japan, like England at an earlier
outlook 15 concerned .

dat~,

is somewhat similar insofar as its

The Japanese, regardless of their position, have only one

basic question to ask, and. that is: ItWhere is the next meal coming from?n Not more
than 16 percent of Japan's land. is arable, so the Japanese have to trade to live;
anywhere, and with any country.

So far they have stayed out of the Chinese Com-

munist and Russian orbit, although there is a small amount of trade being

c~-ried

on between Hokltaido and the Soviet Union.
But, I think as Americans we have to recognize that as far as the peace of
the Pacific is concerned, it is dependent largely

ourselves.

u~n

two countries -- Japan and

If Japan is go!ng to live and survive, and if she is going to keep on

importing your coal, for example, and other products of this country, she's got to
have markets in which she can sell her finished products .

They are an ingenious

and a capable people, but if they can't make a living with the tree world, as a
matter of necessity they are going to be forced to depend on trade with China and
the Soviet Union -- and the next step will be the absorption of the Japanese Empire
into that particular economic bloco

'lhink of

thf\t~

And think: of what it woul d

•
•
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if an industrial complex like Japan, because of necesaity, was

forc~d

the bloc controlled by the Soviet Un10n?
tfuat about Af'rlca?

1bere are mining interests there.

'!hey 8.!"e not

~.r.

too

good a shape at the present time, although I understand that they are operating at
n~ar-cn~~c!ty.

You have had 14, perhaps 15, new nations come into being this year.

Many of them are not prepared to operate on an independent basis, beceuse t!ley

haven't got the cadres to put to work to rue their

~over~ents.

J~ t~e

Congo alcce,

for example, in this huge area at the time of independence last July there '..rere

only 14 college graduates.

I don't

t~lnk

the number has been increased since that

time, and I don't have to tell you what the situatlcn 1s there because it
the

fron~

o~cupleB

pages of our papers day in and day out, and the difficulties are no

closer to solution.
I would hope that as far as t he states of the ",orld are concerned, it would
be possible to isolate Africa from

t~e

cold war..

I would hope that this country

",ould keep its aid programs -- unilaterally speaking -- to a minimum, and I would
hope teat through the United Nations we could develop a four-quarters

by

tu~d;

means of which this country could contribute 25 percent, Western Europe 25 per=ent;
the soviet Union and its member states 25 percent and the rest of the world 25
percent, for the development of that continent which is in need of help and

wh1r~

may "'ell be the determining factor in the history of our world in the yearo

e.~eadd

Then, of course, we come to Latin America, where many in this room

hav~

a

personal interest as well as eo business interest..

We have been reading about Mr.

Castro aDd "'hat he has

One and a half billion dolla:s

don~

to American property..

worth of American property has been expropriated.
has been paid in return.

Not one cent,

~ ~

not one centavo,

We don't know what the future of Cuba is going to be o

do not think, on the basis of what information we have, that
Communist, but we

o~

~~.

We

Castro is a

that he is being influenced by people who are Communists

or fellow-travelers; men Eke Cbe Guevara, men like his brother Raul and others
who have been able to influence him to such an extent that at the present time wbat
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you have 1s an Inc=ease in Chinese Communist and Soviet influence in that

co~~t=y,

90 miles £'rom our shores .
And what castro has done in CUba can be duplicated in part at least in

practically every other country in Latin America.
it this way.

And to explain that, let me put

Whereas there used to be a fifth column in Spain during the time of

the Spanish Civil war, 1n Latin America what you have today -- 1n my opinion, 1n
every Latin American country --

1s a Castro column.

That column 1s achieving much

in the way of headway, and do not fool yourself that its influence 1s Dot being
felt and that every Latin American government 1s Dot aware of it, because they

~~.

In my opinion, the most important area in the world as far 8S our country
1s concerned, 1s Latin America.
every

~

And I say that with the full recognition that

area is important, too, and that every other area presents difficulties .

I would hope that at long last we would get away from slogans in our relations with
Latin America and get down to bedrock and do something -- not on a unilateral basis;
not on a hit and miss Point Four basis, but on a multilateral cooperative basis.
I think this Administration baa at long last made the kind of a start which should
have been made a long time ago -- Yes, under the Democratic AdoinistratioDs tooZ
when they came before the Congress this 'lear and asked us to authorize an appropriation of $500 million to attack the problema which are most keenly felt in
pr&ctically every Latin American country; problems having to do with

healL~,

hous-

ing, farm reform, sanitation and with other matters.
There are countries in which a start of that kind has been made; countries
in which we have men of the caliber and stature of Pedro Beltran in Peru __ one of
the great men of Latin America -- who has tried to bring about a degree of reform
so that some of the people in this country who did not have land would bave land
to till and to grow' .the proo.ucts which they need.

He has tried to bring into beina

housing programs, on a small scale, and to date he has been quite successful .
bas also been responsible !or the encouragement of American capital carning into

He

•

•
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Peru, and in Southern Pet'U at the present time you have four companies whlc!:l. are

operating a copper development and, I believe, producing a rather sizable amount
of the ore at the present time.

A m~n like Pedro Beltran needs help.

Just a

ca~e

of the

Export-~port

He needs

und~r8tand1ng,

and it isnlt

Bank, it isn't just a case of private American

investment, like these four companies - like Anaconda, like Cerro de Pasco and the

others.

It 1s a case of the Government ss well taking en active interest, because

if you do all these things together I think there will be a chance providing the

Latin Americans themselves vill put up their share; if they cannot because of their
poverity

~Ake

outright appropriations, then I think they can furnish their share in

kind or in some other way.

We have to get
best for Latin America.

aw~y

from the idea that unilaterally we know always what is

We have to recognize that there are as many smart people

in those countries as there are in every country in the world, people just as
as we

ar~,

people who have good ideas that are worth considerat1on.

I would point

to the fact that one of these good ideas comes out of Brazil, in the
as "Operation Pan-America."

known

pro~osal

It isnlt perfect, it has defects; but on the wbole it

is a sound idea, because it looks forward to collective action
a~swer

5mBa~

as far as the Americas are concerned.

Not action by us

a~

that is the
I repeat

~-

but

collective action in which all these countries can have an active participation;
in which all these countries can be treated on the basis of equality so that in all
these countries private enterprise, pr1vate capital) almost always risk capital,
could be given the kind of protection which it needs end which it deserves so that
this kind of business -- and

m1nir~

1s predominant in this particular category --

can get a-"ay from the sudden shifts; the sudden changes; can have aome d'2gree of
assu=ence that they can go down and participate, and invest and for a number of
yea~s

or a number of decades be certain that they can be able to achieve on their

investment a reasonable return.

•
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I would

11~e

to see the Organization of the

Ameri~~n

us~ ~e

StdtP.S

E.uthor ity whi ch i t has in its chf'.rter, but whi ch up to th1<;; t ime i t has been n.fraid
t~e act1v1~ies o.~

t o use, be-co:ne mo:-e active ani take a greater par"':. iD
illlere.

+,he~.!,

I would like to see all the nations of the Amerir.c.s :lend

{1~r:is -

tM.s

best

D'~:1

into the CAS and Dot somebody vhom they want to appoint be.;eusc they feel a place

shou ld be made for him .

That 1s the organization in my opinion which can bring

about a rectifir.ation of the sit uation as it exists in this hemisphere , and

perh~ps

given the authority , t.lle m::mey and the time , br i ng o!'der out of the chaos uh:l..C':h

exists

~t

preser.t.

It is time for us, as members of Congress , as mecoers of lndust:y, as
member s of organized lE.bor , as meml)ero of the American public gene::ralJ.y, to recog nize t hat as times change we must change with them .

The world will not stand still .

The world will not give us a chance to look back over our shou l der .
for

g~est

Re:nemb~r

The world calls

deeds, great courage , great leadership, and the stakes are high .
-_ Mr. Khrushchev not so

ma~

months ago made the st.atement that " :!.n M.s

opinion our grandchildren would live to gro'W" up under Communism."
Khrushchev l ies.

I se.y that

~.

If we will exerc i se the leader ship and the ingenuity wh i ch we as

a people have alwa ys possessed, I think we can change the tide which now seeres t o
be running agai nst us so that perhaps Mr . Khrushchev ' s grandchilclren w11l ":Ie able ,
God willing, to live u::lder a syst.em which 1s mo!"e

Mr. Khrushchev advocate s at the

~e~ent

What I am trying to say is this :
for e i gn policy.
f r om t hat s t ake .

d~rnocrat!c

than the fiy3teo whlc.l:l

time.
That every Ameri can has a stake in

And no Amer ican -- no Amer ican bUsi nessman -- can divorce himself
What 'we are engaged in is a

m1sta!te about that .

We either win or we lose.

whether we are Democrats or Republicans.

Rt ru~~le

-

'-

-

for survival.

M:l.ke no

And it doesn ' t make any difference

What does make a diff erence is thnt we

act as AI:ier icansj that we face up t o these problems ; t hat we make the sacri fices

•
•

.

~

.
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necessary; and that we do it with a ful l heart and with wholehearted approval of
whoever may be the leader of our Government at any gi ven time .
their s ; when you get right down to it the choice is

~~o

The

The choice 1an l t
C~ver~nt

of the

United states 1s not a President, it 1s not a Congress, the Government of the
United States is t he people of the United state s and don't you ever

Thank you very much .

- 000-

forge~!

